Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/06/ukraine-president-signs-eu-trade-and-economic-pact.php
attorney at law attorney definition attorney directory attorney fees
Monday, June 30, 2014
Ukraine president signs EU trade and economic pact
[JURIST] New Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko [official website] on Friday signed a trade and economic pact [press release] with the European Union (EU) [official website] in an attempt to move from past Russian ties towards European influence. Ukraine, along with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, is currently a part of the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP) [official website], which was organized by the Committee of the Regions (COR) [official website] to develop...
Wisconsin public employee collective bargaining statute amendments declared unconstitutional
A teachers' union sought declarative and injunctive relief against the governor, claiming that statutory amendments dealing with municipal employees' collective bargaining rights and payroll deductions of dues and pension contributions were unconstitutional.
The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional. Madison Teachers v. Walker (Wisconsin Circuit Ct 09/14/2012)
(1) Certain portions of the statute violated the free speech clauses of the Wisconsin and US constitutions. Although there is no constitutional right to collective bargaining, the statute imposes burdens on the speech and associational rights of employees represented by unions which burdens are not imposed on other employees. They cannot negotiate wage increases greater than the cost of living, they cannot pay dues by payroll deductions solely because the dues go to labor organizations. A ban on fair share agreements means that union members bear the cost of bargaining for non-members who receive the befits of bargaining. Requiring unions to be recertified annually burdens members with the full costs of the election.
(2) The trial court applied strict scrutiny to the equal protection claims because of the infringement on speech rights. The statute creates two classes of employees (represented and non-represented), and the defendants "offer no defense of the statute that would survive strict scrutiny."
(3) Certain portions of the statute violated the Wisconsin constitution's home rule amendment, violated the constitutional bar on impairment of contracts, and deprived employees of property without due process.
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/09/wisconsin_publi.html
litigation attorney local attorney local lawyer local solicitors mold attorney
Some Companies Can Refuse To Cover Contraception, Supreme Court Says
The case, Burwell vs. Hobby Lobby, is perhaps the most important decision of the term. It centers on the Affordable Care Act's guarantee of no-cost prescription contraception.
ENERGY LAW: A SPECIAL REPORT: Digging In
Invigorated exploration for more resources is delivering plenty of work to the legal industry. Our report highlights changes in the law of importance to the attorneys who handle the matters.
Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202626153260?rss=rss_nlj
H-P Working to Settle Lawsuits Related to Disastrous Deal
Hewlett Packard Co. confirmed Friday it is negotiating to settle three lawsuits related to its 2011 acquisition of software firm Autonomy, but the company hasn't yet moved past the fallout from the disastrous deal.
free lawyer consultation california free lawyers free legal advice free legal aid
Pot Use On The Rise In U.S., Report Says
Unlike in the rest of the world, more Americans are using the drug, according to a new United Nations report. Marijuana's potency is also on the rise, the report found.
legal aid legal aid eugene oregon legal aid society legal counsel legal help
More Churn at Squire Patton Boggs as the Post-Merger Dust Settles
divorce lawyers download power of attorney dui attorney dui lawyer
Judge Taps Veterans of Toyota Case to Take on GM
Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/06/26/judge-taps-veterans-of-toyota-case-to-take-on-gm/?mod=WSJBlog
colorado disability lawyer commercial law common law company law conservator
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Boy Plays With Fire, Will Have To Pay The Consequences, And I Do Mean “Pay”
I think it’s fair to say that virtually every kid on earth is told not to play with fire. Many kids ignore it, and manage to escape unscathed. Such was not the case for an 11-year-old boy in Sweden. He was 9 on that fateful day. Per The Local (Sweden):
An 11-year-old boy has been ordered to pay 1.9 million kronor (US $276,000) in damages after causing smoke and water damage to a Stockholm home, the Aftonbladet newspaper writes.
The boy, who was nine at the time, was visiting another family in the suburb in southern Stockholm when he got hold of a cigarette lighter and proceeded to set light to some paper in a wardrobe with devastating consequences.
The insurance company agreed to meet the costs incurred by the family for the damages to their home – 1.9 million kronor – and then proceeded to sue the boy in court.
Well that should make for some really good public relations …
The court has now ruled that the boy is responsible for his actions – the debt can not be claimed from the other members of his family.
“According to Swedish law children can be liable for damages to the same extent as adults,” said Mårten Schultz, an expert in liability law, told the newspaper. “The debt is the child’s, it is the boy that has to pay up,” he confirmed.
Are they going to garnish his allowance? Here’s the source.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/dCZhT4NaLWc/adf-13.html
employment law employment law courses employment lawyer employment lawyer san diego
Washington's sexual orientation discrimination amendment is not retroactive
The Washington State Supreme Court held today that a sexual orientation discrimination amendment adopted in 2006 is not retroactive.
The court also concluded that conduct that took place prior to the amendment is admissible background evidence to prove the discriminatory nature of certain conduct occurring after the amendment.
Loeffelholz v. Univ of Washington (Washington 09/13/2012)
Loeffelholz sued under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) claiming discrimination based on sexual orientation. WLAD was amended in 2006 to include sexual orientation as a protected class, and Loeffelholz alleged several pre-amendment acts and one post-amendment act.
The Washington Supreme Court held that (1) the WLAD amendment is not retroactive and the pre-amendment conduct is not actionable as it was not unlawful when it occurred, and (2) the post-amendment allegedly discriminatory comment is arguably similar enough to the pre-amendment conduct to survive summary judgment.
Loeffelholz alleged that her supervisor between 2003 and June 2006 maintained a hostile work environment based on sexual orientation. This was prior to the WLAD amendment. Loeffelholz also alleged a single act of discrimination by this supervisor after the WLAD amendment.
The court's findings:
(1) Pre-amendment conduct is not actionable. Retroactive application of the amendment would violate the employer's due process rights. The plain language of the amendment and its legislative history indicate only prospective application.
(2) Pre-amendment conduct is admissible as background evidence to prove why the post-amendment conduct is discriminatory.
(3) The post-amendment conduct was a single statement by Loeffelholz's supervisor, who was about to be deployed to Iraq, that he was "going to come back a very angry man." The court found that a reasonable jury could infer that this comment was a natural extension of pre-amendment conduct - the supervisor's dislike of lesbians and his anger management problems as illustrated by his comments that he had a volatile temper and kept a gun. This is enough to preclude summary judgment.
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/09/washingtons_sex.html
legal advice legal advice online legal aid legal aid eugene oregon legal aid society
Federal judge upholds Colorado gun control laws
[JURIST] A judge for the US District Court for the District of Colorado [official website] on Thursday upheld [opinion, PDF] two Colorado statutes that expanded mandatory background checks and banned high capacity magazines. CRS § 18-12-302 and CRS § 18-12-112 [texts, PDF] were challenged by a group of individuals and entities who claimed that the laws violated the Second Amendment [text] to the US constitution. Chief Judge Marcia Krieger found that the two laws did not violate the Second Amendment...
Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/06/federal-judge-upholds-colorado-gun-control-laws.php
free lawyers free legal advice free legal aid getting power of attorney
Boy Plays With Fire, Will Have To Pay The Consequences, And I Do Mean “Pay”
I think it’s fair to say that virtually every kid on earth is told not to play with fire. Many kids ignore it, and manage to escape unscathed. Such was not the case for an 11-year-old boy in Sweden. He was 9 on that fateful day. Per The Local (Sweden):
An 11-year-old boy has been ordered to pay 1.9 million kronor (US $276,000) in damages after causing smoke and water damage to a Stockholm home, the Aftonbladet newspaper writes.
The boy, who was nine at the time, was visiting another family in the suburb in southern Stockholm when he got hold of a cigarette lighter and proceeded to set light to some paper in a wardrobe with devastating consequences.
The insurance company agreed to meet the costs incurred by the family for the damages to their home – 1.9 million kronor – and then proceeded to sue the boy in court.
Well that should make for some really good public relations …
The court has now ruled that the boy is responsible for his actions – the debt can not be claimed from the other members of his family.
“According to Swedish law children can be liable for damages to the same extent as adults,” said Mårten Schultz, an expert in liability law, told the newspaper. “The debt is the child’s, it is the boy that has to pay up,” he confirmed.
Are they going to garnish his allowance? Here’s the source.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/dCZhT4NaLWc/adf-13.html
lawyer fees lawyer firm lawyer malpractice attorneys lawyer office lawyers
New Documents Reveal GM Criminal Probe Likely Picking Up Steam
The situation concerning General Motors Co. and its defective ignition switches has caught the attention of Justice Department prosecutors, and the investigation seems to be moving right along, according to WSJ reporter Jeff Bennett in a story Friday.
find lawyer free attorney consultation free lawyer free lawyer advice
THE NLJ 350: The NLJ 350 Regional Report: The Top U.S. and International Markets
Our Regional Report takes the headcount numbers from our NLJ 350 survey and dices up the data, region by region. • See the complete 2014 NLJ 350 survey results.
Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1402583484262?rss=rss_nlj
download power of attorney dui attorney dui lawyer dumb laws
Highlights from the Supreme Court’s Cellphone Search Ruling
Law Blog collects key passages from the cellphone privacy ruling handed down by the Supreme Court on Wednesday.
commercial law common law company law conservator copyright lawyer
Saturday, June 28, 2014
Special Report: Judicial Transparency
Financial disclosure reports for 257 federal appellate judges reveal a trove of details about their outside earnings.
Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202654964129?rss=rss_nlj
LawBiz® Legal Pad: Pre-owned Car
Interested in making your firm more profitable? This video is for you.
Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/LA-hViXx0Yw/
find a lawyer find an attorney find attorney find lawyer free attorney consultation
What Would Atticus Have Done?
Hearing that the mob was going to storm the jail and lynch Tom Robinson, the fictional Atticus Finch stood at the doorway to block their entrance. Among criminal defense lawyers, Atticus Finch is revered as a paragon of honor. Not all lawyers saw it that way.
Yesterday was Race Day at the New York Times, where two op-eds argued the failure of a certain verdict in Florida was due to the one word unspoken throughout the trial, race. In a "surprising" choice that suggests the power of an excellent public relations team, one op-ed was by Gloria Allred's daughter, Lisa Bloom, who, after explaining the basis for her assumption about what was inside George Zimmerman's head, illuminated the race issue with the insightful:
This isn't a legal argument, however. Bloom and Yankah are both writing from the legal perspective, but what they are writing about isn't legal. It's sociological, a condemnation of a society that is still racist despite having a black president. Anyone who thinks it's "problem solved" is delusional.
But Yankah contends that it is "the simplest of truths: that race and law cannot be cleanly separated." Cleanly? No, it probably can't be cleanly separated, though it's similarly unclear that this constitutes "the simplest of truths." There is nothing simple about it.
It gives rise to a troubling question, that Yankah fails to adequately address and is way over Bloom's head.
Does the introduction of race by the prosecution into Zimmerman's perceptions alter the rule of self-defense? Does it render his subsequent conduct unlawful, even if it would have been lawful otherwise? Should there be two rules of law, one for interactions between people of different races where perceptions of the significance of conduct is assumed to be racially related, if not motivated?
To point out that we still live in a society where race remains a pervasive unresolved issue is to state the obvious. To suggest that the criminal law should accommodate it is to present an intractable problem. Atticus Finch didn't hesitate to put his life on the line for his client, a black man accused of raping a white woman. But he didn't do enough because he didn't confront the racist society in defending Tom Robinson?
If the prosecution had been allowed, and inclined, to argue that George Zimmerman's conduct was racially motivated, and that his ultimate decision to shoot and kill Trayvon Martin was, at least in the tiniest of ways, based upon his race, would that have rendered his belief that he was about to suffer death or serious injury unreasonable? If his head was being beaten against concrete by a white youth, as opposed to a black youth, would the harm have been different?
The argument that this scenario would never have commenced had Trayvon Martin been a white youth in a sports jacket and khakis is likely true. It's pure speculation no matter how much your head screams "yes, yes, yes," of course, but still. Yet how would the law have been any different at the point where a shot was fired?
If we are to have a nation of laws to guide ourselves, how do we draw these vague, fuzzy lines where the law ceases to apply, where it's a free for all, where there is no longer a fixed right and wrong and everything becomes a matter of feelings, assumptions and personal perspective? Yankah may be right that race and law cannot be cleanly separated in our collective consciousness, but then we cease to be a nation of laws when we ignore one for the other.
You might prefer that to happen here, but will you feel the same when you sit in the defendant's chair? So what would Atticus Finch have done? He would have defended George Zimmerman based on the law, even if he failed to meet Monroe Freedman's expectation that he not be morally ambiguous. Atticus Finch would have still been the paragon of honor, even in the face of societal condemnation. That's what criminal defense lawyers do. That's what we are sworn to do.
© 2007-13 Simple Justice NY LLC. This feed is for personal, non-commercial & Newstex use only. The use of this feed on any other website is a copyright violation. If this feed is not via RSS reader or Newstex, it infringes the copyright.
In 1992, Monroe Freedman, a legal ethics expert, published two articles in the national legal newspaper Legal Times calling for the legal profession to set aside Atticus Finch as a role model. Freedman argued that Atticus still worked within a system of institutionalized racism and sexism and should not be revered. Freedman's article sparked a flurry of responses from attorneys who entered the profession holding Atticus Finch as a hero, and the reason they became lawyers. Critics of Atticus such as Freedman maintain that Atticus Finch is morally ambiguous and does not use his legal skills to challenge the racist status quo in Maycomb.While Atticus might have fulfilled the highest calling of a lawyer, Freedman saw the character as failing his calling as a human being in a racist society, and considered that to be a fatal flaw.
Monroe H. Freedman, ""Atticus Finch, Esq., R.I.P.,"" 14 LEGAL TIMES 20 (1992); Monroe H. Freedman, ""Finch: The Lawyer Mythologized,"" 14 LEGAL TIMES 25 (1992) and Monroe Freedman, Atticus Finch – Right and Wrong, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 473 (1994).
Yesterday was Race Day at the New York Times, where two op-eds argued the failure of a certain verdict in Florida was due to the one word unspoken throughout the trial, race. In a "surprising" choice that suggests the power of an excellent public relations team, one op-ed was by Gloria Allred's daughter, Lisa Bloom, who, after explaining the basis for her assumption about what was inside George Zimmerman's head, illuminated the race issue with the insightful:
Huh?In contrast, Cardozo lawprof Ekow Yankah invokes the spirit of his fellow lawprof, Freedman, in writing:
The anger felt by so many African-Americans speaks to the simplest of truths: that race and law cannot be cleanly separated. We are tired of hearing that race is a conversation for another day. We are tired of pretending that “reasonable doubt” is not, in every sense of the word, colored.This conforms with my assumption as well. I find it impossible to believe that Zimmerman's perception of Martin as being "a punk" wasn't colored by race. Sure, there was also youth and attire, but it was part of the whole package. And to the extent that his skin color played a role in his perception that this was a kid who needed to be followed, who posed a threat of doing something wrong, it is racist. Maybe not white hooded, cross-burning racism, but racist nonetheless.
Every step Mr. Martin took toward the end of his too-short life was defined by his race. I do not have to believe that Mr. Zimmerman is a hate-filled racist to recognize that he would probably not even have noticed Mr. Martin if he had been a casually dressed white teenager.
This isn't a legal argument, however. Bloom and Yankah are both writing from the legal perspective, but what they are writing about isn't legal. It's sociological, a condemnation of a society that is still racist despite having a black president. Anyone who thinks it's "problem solved" is delusional.
But Yankah contends that it is "the simplest of truths: that race and law cannot be cleanly separated." Cleanly? No, it probably can't be cleanly separated, though it's similarly unclear that this constitutes "the simplest of truths." There is nothing simple about it.
It gives rise to a troubling question, that Yankah fails to adequately address and is way over Bloom's head.
What is reasonable to do, especially in the dark of night, is defined by preconceived social roles that paint young black men as potential criminals and predators. Black men, the narrative dictates, are dangerous, to be watched and put down at the first false move. This pain is one all black men know; putting away the tie you wear to the office means peeling off the assumption that you are owed equal respect. Mr. Martin’s hoodie struck the deepest chord because we know that daring to wear jeans and a hooded sweatshirt too often means that the police or other citizens are judged to be reasonable in fearing you.Being fully willing to accept that race factored into Zimmerman's perception, based on my own personal bias, the question that remains unanswered is what should the law have done about it?We know this, yet every time a case like this offers a chance for the country to tackle the evil of racial discrimination in our criminal law, courts have deliberately silenced our ability to expose it. The Supreme Court has held that even if your race is what makes your actions suspicious to the police, their suspicions are reasonable so long as an officer can later construct a race-neutral narrative.
Does the introduction of race by the prosecution into Zimmerman's perceptions alter the rule of self-defense? Does it render his subsequent conduct unlawful, even if it would have been lawful otherwise? Should there be two rules of law, one for interactions between people of different races where perceptions of the significance of conduct is assumed to be racially related, if not motivated?
To point out that we still live in a society where race remains a pervasive unresolved issue is to state the obvious. To suggest that the criminal law should accommodate it is to present an intractable problem. Atticus Finch didn't hesitate to put his life on the line for his client, a black man accused of raping a white woman. But he didn't do enough because he didn't confront the racist society in defending Tom Robinson?
If the prosecution had been allowed, and inclined, to argue that George Zimmerman's conduct was racially motivated, and that his ultimate decision to shoot and kill Trayvon Martin was, at least in the tiniest of ways, based upon his race, would that have rendered his belief that he was about to suffer death or serious injury unreasonable? If his head was being beaten against concrete by a white youth, as opposed to a black youth, would the harm have been different?
The argument that this scenario would never have commenced had Trayvon Martin been a white youth in a sports jacket and khakis is likely true. It's pure speculation no matter how much your head screams "yes, yes, yes," of course, but still. Yet how would the law have been any different at the point where a shot was fired?
If we are to have a nation of laws to guide ourselves, how do we draw these vague, fuzzy lines where the law ceases to apply, where it's a free for all, where there is no longer a fixed right and wrong and everything becomes a matter of feelings, assumptions and personal perspective? Yankah may be right that race and law cannot be cleanly separated in our collective consciousness, but then we cease to be a nation of laws when we ignore one for the other.
You might prefer that to happen here, but will you feel the same when you sit in the defendant's chair? So what would Atticus Finch have done? He would have defended George Zimmerman based on the law, even if he failed to meet Monroe Freedman's expectation that he not be morally ambiguous. Atticus Finch would have still been the paragon of honor, even in the face of societal condemnation. That's what criminal defense lawyers do. That's what we are sworn to do.
© 2007-13 Simple Justice NY LLC. This feed is for personal, non-commercial & Newstex use only. The use of this feed on any other website is a copyright violation. If this feed is not via RSS reader or Newstex, it infringes the copyright.
Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/16/what-would-atticus-have-done.aspx?ref=rss
Facial Recognition Technology: Security vs. Privacy Concerns
Imagine a computer thousands of miles away recognizing you in a camera at an intersection. Furthermore, consider being tracked and monitored from your home to your place of work every day. Facial recognition technology makes this type of identification possible and it is being rapidly developed for country defense and law enforcement purposes. On this episode of Lawyer 2 Lawyer, host J. Craig Williams interviews Ed Tivol from EWA, Government Systems, Inc. and Jennifer Lynch from Electronic Frontier Foundation. Together, they discuss the paradox of security vs. privacy when it comes to biometric modes of identification. In addition, they deliberate on how this data is being collected, who is collecting it, and for what purpose. Tune in to hear about your evolving First and Fourth Amendment Rights in the face of national security, crime prevention, and the private sector.
Jennifer Lynch is a Senior Staff Attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation and works on open government, transparency, and privacy issues as part of EFF's Transparency Project. She is a writer and frequent speaker on government surveillance programs, domestic drones, intelligence community misconduct, and biometrics. Lynch has testified about facial recognition before Senate Subcommittees and prior to joining EFF, she was the Clinical Teaching Fellow with the Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic at UC Berkeley School of Law.
Ed Tivol is the Vice President of the Intelligence and Operations Division for EWA, Government Systems, Inc. a defense contractor actively developing facial recognition technology for the Federal Government. He is a 1964 graduate of The Citadel and served in the Army's Military Intelligence branch for 24 years. Tivol completed two tours in Vietnam and retired with the rank of Colonel in 1990. In the same year, he began his work with EWA and has been there ever since. Ed holds master's degrees from University of Maryland and the Army War College. Today Mr. Tivol and his wife raise racehorses and Angus cattle outside of Bowling Green, Kentucky.
Special thanks to our sponsor, Clio.
Jennifer Lynch is a Senior Staff Attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation and works on open government, transparency, and privacy issues as part of EFF's Transparency Project. She is a writer and frequent speaker on government surveillance programs, domestic drones, intelligence community misconduct, and biometrics. Lynch has testified about facial recognition before Senate Subcommittees and prior to joining EFF, she was the Clinical Teaching Fellow with the Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic at UC Berkeley School of Law.
Ed Tivol is the Vice President of the Intelligence and Operations Division for EWA, Government Systems, Inc. a defense contractor actively developing facial recognition technology for the Federal Government. He is a 1964 graduate of The Citadel and served in the Army's Military Intelligence branch for 24 years. Tivol completed two tours in Vietnam and retired with the rank of Colonel in 1990. In the same year, he began his work with EWA and has been there ever since. Ed holds master's degrees from University of Maryland and the Army War College. Today Mr. Tivol and his wife raise racehorses and Angus cattle outside of Bowling Green, Kentucky.
Special thanks to our sponsor, Clio.
personal injury lawyer personal injury lawyers power attorney power of attorney power of attorny
NLRB's recent significant decisions
The NLRB this week made public a number of significant decisions, most reached in the final days of the term of Member Brian Hayes, which ended on December 16. The Board continues with three members, Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce and Members Richard F. Griffin, Jr. and Sharon Block.
The decisions touch on a variety of issues including social media postings, charter school jurisdiction, backpay awards, the chargeability of certain union lobbying expenses, and an employer’s responsibility to continue dues collection after the expiration of a contract.
Hispanics United of Buffalo
The Board found that the employer unlawfully fired five employees because of their Facebook posts and comments about a coworker who intended to complain to management about their work performance. In its analysis, the Board majority applied settled Board law to the new world of social media, finding that the Facebook conversation was concerted activity and was protected by the National Labor Relations Act. Member Hayes dissented.
Alan Ritchey, Inc.
In a unanimous decision that resolved the last of the two-member cases returned following the 2010 Supreme Court decision in New Process Steel, the Board found that where there is no collectively-bargained grievance-arbitration system in place, employers generally must give the union notice and an opportunity to bargain before imposing discipline such as a discharge or suspension on employees. Member Hayes was recused.
Latino Express
In a decision that will affect most cases in which backpay is awarded, the Board decided to require respondents to compensate employees for any extra taxes they have to pay as a result of receiving the backpay in a lump sum. The Board will also require an employer ordered to pay back wages to file with the Social Security Administration a report allocating the back wages to the years in which they were or would have been earned. The Board requested briefs in this case in July 2012. Member Hayes did not participate in the case.
Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy
Rejecting the position of a teachers’ union, the Board found that it had jurisdiction over an Illinois non-profit corporation that operates a public charter school in Chicago. The non-profit was not the sort of government entity exempt from the National Labor Relations Act, the Board majority concluded, and there was no reason for the Board to decline jurisdiction. Member Hayes dissented in part.
United Nurses & Allied Professionals (Kent Hospital)
The Board, with Member Hayes dissenting, addressed several issues involving the rights of nonmember dues objectors under the Supreme Court’s Beck decision. On the main issue, the majority held that, like all other union expenses, lobbying expenses are chargeable to objectors, to the extent that they are germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment. The Board invited further briefing from interested parties on the how it should define and apply the germaneness standard in the context of lobbying activities.
WKYC-TV, Gannet Co.
Applying the general rule against unilateral employer changes in terms and conditions of employment, the Board found that an employer’s obligation to collect union dues under a check-off agreement will continue after the contract expires and before a bargaining impasse occurs or a new contract is reached. Member Hayes dissented.
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/12/nlrbs_recent_si.html
Federal Court Rules Against Utah's Ban On Gay Marriage
A federal appeals court in Denver struck down Utah's ban on gay marriage. It's the first appeals court decision in the nation to date, and paves the way for a U.S. Supreme Court decision on the issue.
employment attorney employment law employment law courses employment lawyer employment lawyer san diego
NFL Lifts Cap on Concussion Damages; Lerner Sought Audit of Senator
The AM Roundup: Law Blog rounds up the morning's news.
THE NLJ 350: The NLJ 350 Regional Report: The Top U.S. and International Markets
Our Regional Report takes the headcount numbers from our NLJ 350 survey and dices up the data, region by region. • See the complete 2014 NLJ 350 survey results.
Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1402583484262?rss=rss_nlj
Friday, June 27, 2014
High Court Ruling On Search Warrants Is Broader Than Cellphones
The justices unanimously ruled that police must obtain a warrant before searching electronic devices at the time of arrest. The decision has been called "a bold endorsement of digital privacy."
Sound The Retreat (Update)
Remember when the word "wilding" was introduced into the general lexicon so that we would have a word to capture the "super-predator" gangs of youths who were intent on destroying society? It came out of the Central Park Five case, and produced a huge shift in our approach to juvenile prosecution and punishment.
"Justice," people cried. They demanded justice. Don't let these super-predator kids destroy our world with wilding.
Except it didn't happen. The kids never beat and raped a woman in Central Park, and were coerced into false confessions. Of course, we didn't learn that until much later, after the wilding scare had done its damage to our laws, procedures and psyches, to save us from the super-predators and give us justice.
The New York Times has a post-Zimmerman-verdict editorial today that threatens to do the same. It's titled "Trayvon Martin's Legacy," a blatant appeal to emotion. Invoking the name of a dead child has proven one of the most utilitarian methods of manipulation available, and the Times unabashedly uses it to further its point.
But the point of the editorial is just plain wrong:
Stand Your Ground laws apply to one aspect of the larger concept of self-defense, and only one: they eliminate the requirement that a person retreat if he can safely do so. To be clear, I believe that Stand Your Ground laws are fundamentally wrong. The balance is a human life, on the one hand, and some machismo principle that a person should not have to endure the humiliation of retreat on the other.
The argument is that they have a right to stand their ground and fight rather than be forced to run away in the face of an attack, even if they can safely do so. Life is not so cheap that it should be taken to protect ego. Many disagree with me, and they're allowed. This isn't a legal judgment, but a moral balance. I come out in favor of life, and have no plans to change.
But that's not how the Times plays the game in its editorial. While blaming Stand Your Ground, they are attacking the basic concept of self-defense having absolutely nothing to do with Stand Your Ground. It's not merely intuitive, which is used to suggest the inherent fight or flight instinct in human beings, but characterized by the Times as some unnatural shift imposed by law to empower "self-deputized" gun nuts with "a grudge."
This is an artfully crafted diversion from the law that existed long before anybody came up with the cool phrase, Stand Your Ground. We always had the right to defend our lives when threatened with death or serious physical injury. If we could safely retreat, then that was the best option and we were required to do so. If not, then we defended our lives.
The underlying gripe is twofold, neither of which have anything to do with Stand Your Ground. The first is playing the race card. Like most people, I can't let go of the assumption that race influenced perceptions here, even though I have no basis for the assumption. But there is no law, nor can there be, that requires us to behave one way when the interaction is black and white versus white and black, or people of the same race. Does the Times suggest we start writing two sets of laws, maybe more, to accommodate the races of participants?
The second is the gun card, as reflected in the "Kel-Tec 9 millimeter" language. New York, not being at all gun-friendly, is easily shaken by words that make guns sound particularly vicious and high tech. And again, I'm no personal fan of guns, having no interest in strapping one on. But a great many other people are fans, and the Second Amendment protects their right to be fans. It's irrelevant whether that's my favorite amendment, just as it's irrelevant whether cops like the Fourth.
The same Constitution we invoke to protect the rights we favor protects some things that we don't. Either we honor the Constitution or not, and that includes all the parts, even the ones that aren't as dear to us as others.
A guy is cornered, there is no escape. The other guy is big. Huge. Strong. And is about to bash his head in. The cornered guy has a gun (give it whatever nasty gun-type name you want). Should the law prohibit him from using it to save his life? But that's not the facts in Zimmerman, you say. True, but laws don't exist for every conceivable set of facts and circumstances people can come up with, and the law of self-defense applies to this scenario the same as it did in Zimmerman. Would it make you feel better to have the cornered guy die because the law prohibited him from using his gun to save his life?
While the New York Times editorial may fairly argue for racial tolerance and the evils of guns, Second Amendment be damned, what it cannot do is lie to people by claiming that Trayvon Martin would not be dead but for Stand Your Ground laws, and then call for the evisceration of our basic, age-old right to self-defense. The alternative to self-defense when one cannot safely retreat is to die.
While it's painfully hard to know whether a person's fear of harm was "reasonable," especially when there is only one side to the confrontation who is alive to tell the story, it's a necessary evil in distinguishing whether force can be lawfully used. The choice was made hundreds of years before anyone ever heard of Trayvon Martin or George Zimmerman, and it's been the right choice for all those years since.
As much as many feel that it played out poorly here, it was always understood that some variations in fact on the same theme would touch our sensibilities differently than others. But the flaw was never with the law. The flaw is that we're human and subject to feelings that may defy reason, and not every application of sound and neutral law will make us feel good about what happened. It's what we must suffer in a society of laws. And the New York Times should know this and be ashamed of itself for engaging in this deception.
Update: In an interview on Anderson Cooper 360, one of the jurors spoke:
© 2007-13 Simple Justice NY LLC. This feed is for personal, non-commercial & Newstex use only. The use of this feed on any other website is a copyright violation. If this feed is not via RSS reader or Newstex, it infringes the copyright.
"Justice," people cried. They demanded justice. Don't let these super-predator kids destroy our world with wilding.
Except it didn't happen. The kids never beat and raped a woman in Central Park, and were coerced into false confessions. Of course, we didn't learn that until much later, after the wilding scare had done its damage to our laws, procedures and psyches, to save us from the super-predators and give us justice.
The New York Times has a post-Zimmerman-verdict editorial today that threatens to do the same. It's titled "Trayvon Martin's Legacy," a blatant appeal to emotion. Invoking the name of a dead child has proven one of the most utilitarian methods of manipulation available, and the Times unabashedly uses it to further its point.
But the point of the editorial is just plain wrong:
The jury reached its verdict after having been asked to consider Mr. Zimmerman’s actions in light of Florida’s now-notorious Stand Your Ground statute. Under that law, versions of which are on the books in two dozen states, a person may use deadly force if he or she “reasonably believes” it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm — a low bar that the prosecutors in this case fought in vain to overcome.It's been explained, calmly and rationally, over and over. It's impossible to believe that the editorial board of the Times, a smart bunch of folks, didn't hear it or grasp it. If so, then what's written here can only be attributed to disingenuousness and a deliberate effort to deceive.These laws sound intuitive: who would argue that you may not protect yourself against great harm? But of course, the concept of “reasonable belief” is transformed into something deadly dangerous when firearms are involved. And when the Stand Your Ground laws intersect with lax concealed-carry laws, it works essentially to self-deputize anyone with a Kel-Tec 9 millimeter and a grudge.
Stand Your Ground laws apply to one aspect of the larger concept of self-defense, and only one: they eliminate the requirement that a person retreat if he can safely do so. To be clear, I believe that Stand Your Ground laws are fundamentally wrong. The balance is a human life, on the one hand, and some machismo principle that a person should not have to endure the humiliation of retreat on the other.
The argument is that they have a right to stand their ground and fight rather than be forced to run away in the face of an attack, even if they can safely do so. Life is not so cheap that it should be taken to protect ego. Many disagree with me, and they're allowed. This isn't a legal judgment, but a moral balance. I come out in favor of life, and have no plans to change.
But that's not how the Times plays the game in its editorial. While blaming Stand Your Ground, they are attacking the basic concept of self-defense having absolutely nothing to do with Stand Your Ground. It's not merely intuitive, which is used to suggest the inherent fight or flight instinct in human beings, but characterized by the Times as some unnatural shift imposed by law to empower "self-deputized" gun nuts with "a grudge."
This is an artfully crafted diversion from the law that existed long before anybody came up with the cool phrase, Stand Your Ground. We always had the right to defend our lives when threatened with death or serious physical injury. If we could safely retreat, then that was the best option and we were required to do so. If not, then we defended our lives.
The underlying gripe is twofold, neither of which have anything to do with Stand Your Ground. The first is playing the race card. Like most people, I can't let go of the assumption that race influenced perceptions here, even though I have no basis for the assumption. But there is no law, nor can there be, that requires us to behave one way when the interaction is black and white versus white and black, or people of the same race. Does the Times suggest we start writing two sets of laws, maybe more, to accommodate the races of participants?
The second is the gun card, as reflected in the "Kel-Tec 9 millimeter" language. New York, not being at all gun-friendly, is easily shaken by words that make guns sound particularly vicious and high tech. And again, I'm no personal fan of guns, having no interest in strapping one on. But a great many other people are fans, and the Second Amendment protects their right to be fans. It's irrelevant whether that's my favorite amendment, just as it's irrelevant whether cops like the Fourth.
The same Constitution we invoke to protect the rights we favor protects some things that we don't. Either we honor the Constitution or not, and that includes all the parts, even the ones that aren't as dear to us as others.
A guy is cornered, there is no escape. The other guy is big. Huge. Strong. And is about to bash his head in. The cornered guy has a gun (give it whatever nasty gun-type name you want). Should the law prohibit him from using it to save his life? But that's not the facts in Zimmerman, you say. True, but laws don't exist for every conceivable set of facts and circumstances people can come up with, and the law of self-defense applies to this scenario the same as it did in Zimmerman. Would it make you feel better to have the cornered guy die because the law prohibited him from using his gun to save his life?
While the New York Times editorial may fairly argue for racial tolerance and the evils of guns, Second Amendment be damned, what it cannot do is lie to people by claiming that Trayvon Martin would not be dead but for Stand Your Ground laws, and then call for the evisceration of our basic, age-old right to self-defense. The alternative to self-defense when one cannot safely retreat is to die.
While it's painfully hard to know whether a person's fear of harm was "reasonable," especially when there is only one side to the confrontation who is alive to tell the story, it's a necessary evil in distinguishing whether force can be lawfully used. The choice was made hundreds of years before anyone ever heard of Trayvon Martin or George Zimmerman, and it's been the right choice for all those years since.
As much as many feel that it played out poorly here, it was always understood that some variations in fact on the same theme would touch our sensibilities differently than others. But the flaw was never with the law. The flaw is that we're human and subject to feelings that may defy reason, and not every application of sound and neutral law will make us feel good about what happened. It's what we must suffer in a society of laws. And the New York Times should know this and be ashamed of itself for engaging in this deception.
Update: In an interview on Anderson Cooper 360, one of the jurors spoke:
COOPER: Because of the only, the two options you had, second degree murder or manslaughter, you felt neither applied?
JUROR: Right. Well, because of the heat of the moment and the stand your ground. He had a right to defend himself. If he felt threatened that his life was going to be taken away from him or he was going to have bodily harm, he had a right.
This mention of stand your ground gave rise to an apology from Eugene Volokh, who had also written about this Times editorial subsequent to this post.
It thus appears that at least one of the jurors did “consider Mr. Zimmerman’s actions in light of the ... Stand Your Ground provision in Florida’s self-defense law,” and on that the Times editorial was right, and I was wrong to criticize it; my apologies to the editorialists, and to our readers.
While there is no issue that stand your ground had no legal bearing on the case, Eugene apologized for arguing that the aspect of the editorial suggesting that the jury somehow relied on it in reaching its verdict. My view is that these were empty words to the juror, having been uttered too many time in the media before trial, and she offered them in the interview either without any grasp of what they meant or inadvertently.
It was a loose phrase, not a reflection that an unrelated legal concept, mentioned in passing as part of pattern jury instructions, and never argued to the jury, played a role. Loose language shouldn't be taken too seriously and serve as a basis for assuming scholar-like attention to something that scholars universally agree had no place in the case.
While it was gracious of Eugene to apologize, it was both unnecessary and, perhaps, a mistake to feed misguided understandings about a law which is being blamed for a role it never played.
© 2007-13 Simple Justice NY LLC. This feed is for personal, non-commercial & Newstex use only. The use of this feed on any other website is a copyright violation. If this feed is not via RSS reader or Newstex, it infringes the copyright.
Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/15/sound-the-retreat.aspx?ref=rss
free lawyer consultation california free lawyers free legal advice free legal aid getting power of attorney
Jordan court acquits radical cleric of terrorism charges
[JURIST] A three-man civilian panel in the Jordanian State Security Court [Jordan government website] on Thursday declared radical preacher Abu Qatada [BBC profile; JURIST news archive] not guilty of terrorism offences relating to an alleged plot [Al Jazeera report] in 1998 on the American school in Amman. The court ruled there was insufficient evidence to find Qatada guilty of terrorism charges for the 1998 plot, but he will remain imprisoned [Reuters report] in Jordan for his alleged role in an...
Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/06/jordan-court-finds-radical-preacher-not-guilty-of-terrorism.php
Plaintiffs Seek to Consolidate Target Data Breach Suits
Attorneys who filed class actions against Target Corp. over its security breach last month have moved to coordinate the swelling tide of litigation, estimated at nearly 50 lawsuits.
Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202637342683?rss=rss_nlj
divorce atterney divorce attorney divorce lawers divorce lawyer divorce lawyers
The Federal Laws that Affect Workers Compensation Claims
When a workers' compensation claim is made, there are many elements of federal law that get triggered. Among those elements are the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Family and Medical Leave Act, and Americans with Disabilities Act. As an employer, navigating these intersecting laws can be a challenging task while running a business. On this episode of Workers Comp Matters, host Alan Pierce interviews Melissa Fleischer from the HR Learning Center LLC. Together they discuss multiple federal components affecting workers' compensation claim rights and duties. In addition they talk about when workers can be terminated, healthcare commitments under COBRA, and unpaid leave. Tune in to learn more about different paperwork requirements under the different federal laws plus much much more.
Melissa Fleischer, Esq. is the President and Founder of HR Learning Center LLC with 20 years of law practice experience specializing in employment discrimination litigation. Her HR consulting firm specializes in providing workplace solutions and training to employers on a wide range of legal and human resource management issues. She was previously associated with Epstein Becker and Green in NYC and served as a chapter editor for the Family and Medical Leave Act Treatise, published by the Bureau of National Affairs. Ms. Fleischer is also an adjunct faculty member with the Professional Development Center at SUNY/Westchester Community College in Valhalla, New York and a member of the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM).
Special thanks to our sponsor, PInow.
Melissa Fleischer, Esq. is the President and Founder of HR Learning Center LLC with 20 years of law practice experience specializing in employment discrimination litigation. Her HR consulting firm specializes in providing workplace solutions and training to employers on a wide range of legal and human resource management issues. She was previously associated with Epstein Becker and Green in NYC and served as a chapter editor for the Family and Medical Leave Act Treatise, published by the Bureau of National Affairs. Ms. Fleischer is also an adjunct faculty member with the Professional Development Center at SUNY/Westchester Community College in Valhalla, New York and a member of the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM).
Special thanks to our sponsor, PInow.
legal advice legal advice online legal aid legal aid eugene oregon
Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Securities Fraud Complaint Where Inference of Scienter Was Not Sufficiently Strong
In Yates v. Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC, No. 12-2496 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), against defendant Municipal Mortgage & Equity (“MuniMae”) and its individual officer and director defendants. The Court held that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of defendants’ scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, et seq. The Court declined to accept that the inference of scienter offered by plaintiffs — supported by statements from confidential witnesses, presence of red flags, allegations of insider trading and general business incentives — was at least as compelling as the opposing inference of mere negligence that could be drawn from the amended complaint. Yates is one of the few reported decisions from the Fourth Circuit applying the PSRLA, and it solidly reaffirms the PSLRA’s requirement that a plaintiff plead more than just allegations based upon conjecture and happenstance to satisfy heightened pleading requirements.
During the putative class period (May 3, 2004 to January 29, 2008) MuniMae was involved in organizing investment partnerships to pool low-income housing tax credits (“LIHTCs”) and sell them to investors. Prior to 2003, MuniMae treated its LIHTC investment partnerships as off balance sheet entities. In 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board adopted Interpretation No. 46R (“FASB 46R”), requiring that a company that is the primary beneficiary of “Variable Interest Entities” consolidate the entities assets and liabilities onto its financial statements. MuniMae began asserting compliance with FASB 46R in the first quarter of 2004. However, at that time MuniMae internally concluded that FASB 46R did not require it to consolidate for financial statement purposes all of tis LIHTC investment partnerships. MuniMae continued to assert compliance with FASB 46R through 2006. In September 2006, MuniMae announced it would be restating certain financial statements and through a series of later disclosures finally announced that the restatement would deal with FASB 46R accounting errors. As a result of the piecemeal disclosures, MuniMae’s share price dropped precipitously. The following day, MuniMae disclosed the full extent of the restatement’s scope and MuniMae’s stock experienced an additional decline. Eventually, in April 2008, MuniMae disclosed that it had spent over $54 million on the restatement.
Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that defendants made false representations that MuniMae was complying with FASB 46R and concealed the expected cost of the restatement in violation of Section 10(b). The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that the amended complaint did not sufficiently allege a claim under Section 10(b) because it did not meet the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard for scienter allegations. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. First, the Fourth Circuit held that the confidential witness testimony supplied by plaintiffs did not support a “strong inference of wrongful intent.” The testimony did suggest that defendants knew earlier than disclosed that MuniMae was not in compliance with 46R and that the required restatement would be a difficult and costly undertaking. It also indicated that the issue was difficult and complex and had thrown MuniMae into “confusion and chaos” — which the Court held supported the opposing inference that the defendants were merely negligent. In fact, the Court explained, defendants’ subsequent disclosures negated an inference of fraudulent intent because, although the disclosures were not “as timely or as fulsome” as plaintiffs would have liked, they gave rise to a compelling inference that the MuniMae defendants were attempting to keep the investing public informed.
Second, the Court held that while there were several “red flags” concerning MuniMae’s core operations — the need in and of itself for several restatements, frequent accounting meetings, the firing of outside auditors, and rapid CFO overturn — they did not in and of themselves give rise to a strong inference of scienter. Not only was the FASB 46R accounting error not especially obvious, but the other warning signs easily lent themselves to benign interpretations as a result of MiniMae’s obvious attempts to get a handle on its creeping accounting problems.
Third, the Court of Appeals followed the decisions of several other Circuits in holding insufficient plaintiffs’ allegation that the individual defendants “must have acted intentionally or recklessly” merely because they were senior executives and the LIHTC investment partnerships represented a core business of MuniMae.
Fourth, in addressing plaintiffs’ allegations concerning insider trading, the Court held that while the overall value of MuniMae shares sold during the class period was higher than in previous years and thus consistent with an inference that the insiders who traded had a motive to commit fraud, the inference that the trades were innocent was stronger. There were no allegations that the insiders timed their sales to take advantage of any particular disclosure. Nor was the level of any insiders’ divestiture particularly alarming. Moreover, the Court noted, the fact that several of the individual defendants traded under non-discretionary Rule 10b5-1 plans further weakened any inference of fraudulent purpose.
Finally, the Court held that plaintiffs other allegations of motive were similarly lacking as the alleged motivations amounted to nothing more than “financial motivations common to every company.”
Thus, in Yates, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the heightened standard of pleading a plaintiff must meet to satisfy the PSLRA. Specifically, the Court emphasized that the allegations of scienter under Section 10(b) cannot be read in a vaccum. They must be holistically analyzed in comparison with the disclosures actually made by defendants. General business motivations, insider trading and the core nature of the problems alleged by plaintiffs cannot turn a company’s repeated attempts to inform investors of the ongoing and ever-evolving nature of a problem into intentional rather than merely negligent conduct.
copyright lawyer corporate law corporate lawyer criminal attorney criminal defence lawyer
Revenge Porn: Societal Costs and Legislative Solutions
The non-consensual posting of nude or sexual media by one person of another is known as Revenge Porn. Many victims report that this practice has had detrimental effects on their lives. Of those surveyed, 90 percent are women and 49 percent say they've been stalked or harassed. Despite the growing number of reports, most states' laws do not address the issue. On this episode of Lawyer 2 Lawyer, hosts Bob Ambrogi and J. Craig Williams interview victim-advocate Dr. Holly Jacobs, a victim of revenge porn herself, and Professor Mary Anne Franks, both of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. Together, they discuss the technical aspects of various states' laws that allow some types of posts while forbidding others. Many factors and technicalities, including who took the picture, how the image or video was obtained, and who posted it, can dictate whether posting the item was illegal. Tune in to this very special episode to learn what individual states and the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative are doing to combat Revenge Porn. A follow up episode with guest Lee Rowland from the American Civil Liberties Union will examine other legal issues regarding Revenge Porn. It will be released on April 8th.
Dr. Holly Jacobs is the Founder, President, and Executive Director of Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, which is the parent organization for the End Revenge Porn Campaign. She is a national commentator and writer on the subject and holds a PhD in Industrial/Organizational Psychology. While pursuing her graduate degrees, Jacobs became a victim of revenge porn and has since dedicated her life towards providing resources and advocacy to victims of online harassment.
Professor Mary Anne Franks is the Vice President of Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. She holds a JD from Harvard Law School and prior to her teaching career, obtained both her Masters and PhD in Modern Languages and Literature as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. As part of her continuing efforts with the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, she works with state legislatures to draft legislation against non-consensual pornography.
Dr. Holly Jacobs is the Founder, President, and Executive Director of Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, which is the parent organization for the End Revenge Porn Campaign. She is a national commentator and writer on the subject and holds a PhD in Industrial/Organizational Psychology. While pursuing her graduate degrees, Jacobs became a victim of revenge porn and has since dedicated her life towards providing resources and advocacy to victims of online harassment.
Professor Mary Anne Franks is the Vice President of Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. She holds a JD from Harvard Law School and prior to her teaching career, obtained both her Masters and PhD in Modern Languages and Literature as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. As part of her continuing efforts with the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, she works with state legislatures to draft legislation against non-consensual pornography.
traffic lawyer traffic ticket lawyer absolute power of attorney attorney
Payout Resolves Objections to $1.6B Toyota Settlement
Some of the most vocal objectors to the $1.6 billion settlement with Toyota Motor Corp. have agreed to drop their challenge in exchange for $1.5 million to research electronics systems used in cars.
Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202637032014?rss=rss_nlj
lemon law letter of attorney litigation attorney local attorney local lawyer
Thursday, June 26, 2014
Delaware Court of Chancery Underscores Heightened Pleading Standard Necessary to Support a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty In Connection With a Merger
In Houseman v. Sagerman, C.A. No. 8898-VCG, 2014 WL 1478511 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2014), the Delaware Court of Chancery (Glasscock, V.C.) granted, in part, a motion to dismiss filed by certain directors and the financial advisor of Universata, Inc. (“Universata” or the “Company”) arising out of the Company’s merger with HealthPort Technologies, LLC (“HealthPort”). The Court’s analysis serves as a reminder that a stockholder plaintiff must plead an “extreme set of facts” to support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a corporation’s directors arising out of allegations that the directors breached their duty of loyalty as a result of the process used to approve a strategic transaction. Although the allegations suggested that Universata’s board of directors (the “Board”) did not conduct a “perfect” process, plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient to show that the Board “utterly failed to undertake any action to obtain the best price for stockholders.” As a result, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Universata was a Delaware corporation focused on providing services with respect to medical records for hospitals and clinics. In 2006, plaintiffs sold a previous business known as Med-Legal, Inc. to Universata and obtained shares in the Company and put rights to those shares whereby a director of the Company, Thomas Whittington, committed to repurchase plaintiffs’ shares pursuant to the put rights.
In 2010, HealthPort approached Universata regarding a potential acquisition. In response to HealthPort’s indication of interest, the Board consulted with its legal advisors and with KeyBanc Capital Markets, Inc. (“KeyBanc”), which it hired as its financial advisor. Due to expense, the Board limited KeyBanc’s engagement to assisting in diligence and identifying additional parties with an interest in acquiring the Company. Notably, the Board did not request that KeyBanc prepare a fairness opinion on the proposed transaction.
In May 2011, the Board approved an Agreement and Plan of Merger between Universata and HealthPort. As a result of the merger, the stockholders of Universata would receive $1.02 per share. In addition the stockholders of Universata would receive stock in a new corporation known as “TechCo” created to hold a patent previously held by Universata. At the meeting approving the merger, KeyBanc advisors informally gave the opinion that the merger price was within the range of reasonableness. Because the directors who approved the merger collectively held a majority ownership interest in the Company, the Board did not solicit a stockholder vote to approve the transaction. Nevertheless, at the same time as the Board approved the merger, it amended a previous equity incentive plan to treat all outstanding stock options like outstanding shares upon a change in control. In addition, the Board voted to vest all outstanding “in the money” warrants for the purchase of shares in the Company.
Plaintiffs, who were a director of the Company and his wife, approved the letter of intent with HealthPort, but did not vote or execute a consent in favor of the merger. Two years after the merger closed, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint against certain directors of Universata and against KeyBanc asserting causes of action for (i) breach of fiduciary duty against the director defendants; (ii) an accounting against director Whittington; (iii) quasi-appraisal against Universata and the director defendants; (iv) aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against KeyBanc; and (v) for failing to obtain consideration for alleged “litigation assets.” Defendants moved to dismiss.
The Chancery Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the accounting claim. With respect to the other claims, the Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim was premised on the allegation that the director defendants acted in bad faith by “knowingly and completely fail[ing] to undertake their responsibilities” to maximize shareholder value. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the directors satisfied their duty of loyalty by acting on the advice of legal counsel and hiring KeyBanc as their financial advisor. Moreover, the directors were entitled to decide that the expense of obtaining a fairness opinion outweighed its benefits. The allegations in the complaint showed that Board considered bids from several interested parties, negotiated with HealthPort regarding the deal terms, and ultimately obtained from HealthPort “everything that [the Board] felt [it] could get.” Plaintiffs failed to allege any facts to show that the directors had a motive to act in “bad faith.” To the contrary, the Court observed, the directors had a personal financial interest in obtaining the best deal possible, in alignment with the company’s public stockholders. Accordingly, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.
The Court also dismissed the cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against KeyBanc. It found that there were no allegations that KeyBanc actively concealed information from the Board. In addition, KeyBanc did not aid or abet the Board’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty as a result of providing “limited services.” Boiled to its essence, plaintiffs were arguing that “an investment bank must provide all or none of the financial services it offers in valuing and marketing a company.” The Court disagreed and recognized that “Revlon makes clear that there is no single way to sell a company — no single financial service is required.” Accordingly, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
The decision in Houseman confirms that stockholders face a high pleading burden when challenging a disinterested board’s decision to approve a strategic transaction. Although the Court recognized that the Board’s process was “less than optimal,” plaintiffs’ allegations could state a claim only for a violation of the fiduciary duty of care. The board’s decision to proceed with the transaction despite several procedural deficiencies did not amount to an “extreme set of facts” sufficient to support a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty.
criminal defense attorneys criminal defense lawyer criminal injury lawyers criminal justice lawyer
Revenge Porn: Criminal Legislation vs. Rights and Freedoms
Six states have passed laws to address revenge porn, but critics say those laws may infringe upon First Amendment rights and subject people to needless criminal prosecution. Critics of anti-revenge porn laws believe the laws as drafted are overly broad, fail to exempt acceptable behavior, and create a chilling effect on otherwise legal expression. On this follow up episode of Lawyer 2 Lawyer, hosts Bob Ambrogi and J. Craig Williams interview Lee Rowland from the ACLU and Marc Randazza from the Randazza Legal Group. Together we discuss the potentially harmful components of non-consensual porn legislation and consider alternative avenues of redress for victims. Professor Mary Anne Franks of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, a proponent of criminalizing revenge porn, joins us for the second half to debate criticisms of these laws. Tune in for a spirited debate about free speech, over-criminalization, and the proper way to address the troubling issue of revenge porn.
For part one of this two-part series, please listen to Revenge Porn: Societal Costs and Legislative Solutions.
Lee Rowland is a Staff Attorney with the ACLU's Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project. Prior to joining the ACLU, she was a voting rights counsel with the Brennan Center for Justice, where she successfully represented the League of Women Voters of Florida and others in constitutional challenges to Florida's 2011 election law. Rowland previously ran the Reno office of the ACLU of Nevada, where she regularly argued before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Nevada Supreme Court.
Marc Randazza is a First Amendment lawyer for the Randazza Legal Group located in Las Vegas, Nevada. A graduate of Georgetown University Law Center, he found his passion for the First Amendment while attending the University of Massachusetts at Amherst Journalism Program. Randazza has law offices in five states and represents both adult entertainment companies and private individuals. He is a regular contributor to news sources such as CNN and Fox News, and is a frequent commentator on legal issues to the international media.
Professor Mary Anne Franks is the Vice President of Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. She holds a Juris Doctor degree from Harvard Law School and prior to her teaching career, obtained both her Masters and Ph.D. in Modern Languages and Literature as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. As part of her continuing efforts with the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, she works with state legislatures to draft legislation against non-consensual pornography.
Special thanks to our sponsor, Clio.
For part one of this two-part series, please listen to Revenge Porn: Societal Costs and Legislative Solutions.
Lee Rowland is a Staff Attorney with the ACLU's Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project. Prior to joining the ACLU, she was a voting rights counsel with the Brennan Center for Justice, where she successfully represented the League of Women Voters of Florida and others in constitutional challenges to Florida's 2011 election law. Rowland previously ran the Reno office of the ACLU of Nevada, where she regularly argued before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Nevada Supreme Court.
Marc Randazza is a First Amendment lawyer for the Randazza Legal Group located in Las Vegas, Nevada. A graduate of Georgetown University Law Center, he found his passion for the First Amendment while attending the University of Massachusetts at Amherst Journalism Program. Randazza has law offices in five states and represents both adult entertainment companies and private individuals. He is a regular contributor to news sources such as CNN and Fox News, and is a frequent commentator on legal issues to the international media.
Professor Mary Anne Franks is the Vice President of Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. She holds a Juris Doctor degree from Harvard Law School and prior to her teaching career, obtained both her Masters and Ph.D. in Modern Languages and Literature as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. As part of her continuing efforts with the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, she works with state legislatures to draft legislation against non-consensual pornography.
Special thanks to our sponsor, Clio.
employment lawyer employment lawyer san diego employment lawyers estate attorney family law
Affirmative action ban in state constitution violates US constitution (8-7)
Michigan voters adopted a state constitutional amendment that prohibits "all sex- and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting."
The 6th Circuit (8-7) held this provision - as it relates to education - violates the 14th amendment's equal protection clause.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Univ of Michigan (6th Cir 11/15/2012)
(Plaintiffs limited their challenge to racial discrimination in public education.)
The court said that a black applicant could seek adoption of a constitutionally permissible race-conscious admissions policy only through the "lengthy, expensive, and arduous process" of amending the state constitution. On the other hand, someone wishing to change any other aspect of a university's admissions policy has four options - lobby the admissions committee, petition the leadership of the university, seek to influence the school's governing board, or initiate a statewide campaign to alter the state's constitution.
"The existence of such a comparative structural burden undermines the Equal Protection Clause's guarantee that all citizens ought to have equal access to the tools of political change."
Seven judges wrote five DISSENTING opinions. Six said that the majority relied on two US Supreme Court cases that "have no application here," and one said that the majority relied on "an extreme extension" of those cases. The cases are Hunter v. Erickson, 393 US 385 (1969), and Washington v. Seattle Sch Dist, 458 US 457 (1982).
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/11/affirmative_act.html
green card lawyer immigration attorney immigration law immigration lawyer
Federal judge strikes down Indiana same-sex marriage ban
[JURIST] A judge for the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana [official website] on Wednesday struck down [opinion, PDF] Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. Three lawsuits, including one filed [JURIST report] by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) [advocacy website] on behalf of 15 people, all sought to challenge parts of Indiana Code Section 31-11-1-1 [text], which bans all same-sex marriages and bans recognition of same-sex marriages performed out-of-state. The three lawsuits contended that this...
Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/06/federal-judge-strikes-down-indiana-same-sex-marriage-ban.php
criminal defense lawyer criminal injury lawyers criminal justice lawyer criminal law criminal law cases
Aereo's TV Streaming Service Is Illegal, Supreme Court Says
The court's 6-3 decision reverses a lower court ruling on what has been a hotly contested issue. Aereo lets subscribers watch TV programming that it routes onto the Internet.
immigration lawyers injury attorney injury attorneys injury lawers
Supreme Court: Police Can’t Search Smartphones Without Warrant
Police generally must obtain a warrant before searching mobile devices after arresting someone, the Supreme Court ruled Wednesday.
private attorney private lawyer pro bono lawyers probate attorney
Parties Reach New Accord in NFL Concussion Litigation
The National Football League and a group of retired players have agreed to a revised settlement in the concussion injury litigation that would not place any cap on the damages available to players, the parties jointly announced today.
Wednesday, June 25, 2014
Odds Improve for New Law Graduates, but Hiring Levels Remain Soft
It's a lot easier to get an entry-level job at a major law firm than it was during the recession, but law-school graduates still face plenty of competition.
power attorney power of attorney power of attorny private attorney
Of Course You Should Never Return To The Scene Of The Crime …
If you’ve watched any TV, you would know that only serial killers return to the scene of the crime. In this case, returning to the scene of the crime isn’t the issue. This dude never left! As reported in The Brooklyn Paper’s police blotter (88th Precinct – Fort Greene–Clinton Hill):
Authorities arrested a 34-year-old who they say stole beer from a Classon Avenue deli after threatening the clerk with a gun wrapped in a purple bandana on June 12.
You already have more than an inkling as to how this gent was caught.
The deli worker told cops he was in the store between Putnam and Gates avenues at 7:45 am when the accused came in and placed the festively adorned weapon on the counter. The suspect then ambled over to the refrigerator, grabbed three beers, and left without paying, according to a police report.
Cops responded to a call from the clerk and found the accused outside the store, the report says. Police arrested the fellow after they searched him and found a stolen Beretta from Saint Louis, Missouri wrapped in a bandana tucked into his front pocket, according to officials.
He never left!
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/IQAmt3znX7E/adf-12.html
electronic power of attorney employment attorney employment law employment law courses employment lawyer
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)