Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/04/ohio-couples-challenge-same-sex-marriage-ban.php
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Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/04/ohio-couples-challenge-same-sex-marriage-ban.php
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In In re Kosmos Energy Ltd. Securities Litigation, No. 3:12-CV-373-B, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36365 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2014), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Boyle, J.) denied lead plaintiff’s class certification motion in a consolidated action alleging claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2), 77o. The 1933 Act regulates registration and offering statements by holding issuers and other offering participants strictly liable for material misstatements and omissions. Reliance is not an element of the claim. Plaintiff’s class certification motion rested on the notion that 1933 Act claims presumptively deserve class treatment. The district court, however, rejected the continued vitality of this notion in light of the recent “evolution of the case authority on class certification” requiring “a more skeptical view with a more exacting review process.” The district court’s decision recognizes that, as with other substantive areas of law, this “evolution” applies in securities law cases. Hence, historically “pro-plaintiff” approaches to class certification in securities cases (including cases based on 1933 Act claims) must yield to the newly evolved class certification standards.
Defendant Kosmos Energy Ltd. issued a registration statement in connection with its IPO that allegedly misstated the performance of an offshore oil field. Plaintiff, a pension plan, which purchased stock in the IPO, brought 1933 act claims against Kosmos, the underwriting banks, and others. It also sought to certify a class of persons who purchased Kosmos stock “pursuant to or traceable to the IPO,” alleging a class period from May 10, 2011, the IPO date, to January 10, 2012, the date of the first lawsuit.
Defendants argued plaintiff failed to show it could adequately represent the putative class and that common questions of law and fact predominated over questions affecting only individual class members. Before addressing these grounds, the district court reviewed recent U.S. Supreme Court class-action developments. In its view, class certification has “evol[ved]” from a “presumptively pro-plaintiff” approach, allowing certification “based solely on the pleadings or on a modicum of evidentiary support,” to an entirely evidentiary-driven inquiry. It identified the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion last year in Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), as “the culmination of this movement.”
Turning to the question of adequacy, the district court agreed that some precedents had “presumptively favored finding class representatives adequate.” It, declared, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Comcast and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), “leave[] no doubt that plaintiffs can no longer rely upon the lax adequacy standards employed at times in the past. Instead plaintiffs seeking certification must produce actual, credible evidence that the proposed class representatives are informed, able individuals, who are themselves — not the lawyers –– actually directing the litigation.” Plaintiff did not do this. The district court blamed this failure on plaintiff’s misguided view that the new, stricter approach to class certification did not apply to its 1933 Act claims: “Ultimately, the Plan’s fatal mistake was that it apparently presumed its task here is lessened because of the securities law provisions under which this case is filed.”
The district court next addressed predominance. Plaintiff invoked precedents showing district courts favorably disposed to certifying classes in securities cases, arguing that Comcast’s evidence-based approach to Rule 23 was limited to antitrust and other non-securities cases. The court disagreed. “While it is true that courts have, at times, noted that cases brought pursuant to §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act are ‘especially amenable’ to class certification and resolution, ‘it does not follow’ from such isolated statements ‘that a court should relax its certification analysis, or presume a requirement for certification is met, merely because a plaintiff’s claims fall within [the same] substantive categor[y].’”
The district court noted that plaintiff proffered no evidence showing common-question predominance. In contrast, defendants introduced evidence suggesting the availability of a limited, 1933 Act affirmative defense — investor knowledge of the alleged untruth or omission at the time of purchase — that, if adjudicated, would cause issues to predominate over common questions. Specifically, via an expert’s report, defendants introduced an event study showing 14 instances of negative, new information regarding the oil field’s performance entering the market after the IPO date but before the close of the class period, suggesting varying degrees of investor knowledge across the class period. The court noted that the need for individualized affirmative defense inquiries ordinarily cannot defeat class certification where evidence otherwise shows predominance. Here, however, plaintiff had presented “zero-evidence.” The district court denied plaintiff’s class certification motion.
Kosmos makes an emphatic point regarding the application of recent Supreme Court class action decisions to securities cases generally. It specifically identifies Comcast as foreclosing “presumptive” approaches to Rule 23 in securities cases. In other words, it recognizes that any approach that relieves the plaintiff of the Rule 23 evidentiary burden it would otherwise bear stands at odds with Comcast. This observation is particularly cogent as the Supreme Court will soon decide in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 [see blog article here], whether to overrule or modify Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), which adopted the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to permit class actions in cases brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202652463155?rss=rss_nlj
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Ed’s wife reminds him that there’s no such thing as a free lunch, but today Ed shares tips that will promote your firm and services at little expense.
Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/VEEhDKXfLu4/
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This is pretty cool.
EEOC briefs are now on line. [Here]
They cover briefs filed in the US Circuit Courts of Appeals in which the EEOC was a party, plus amicus briefs filed in the US Circuit Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and state courts.
And there is a user-friendly search function.
Briefs filed in the US Supreme Court are not in this collection, and can be found through the US Solicitor General's collection [here].
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/06/eeoc_briefs_on.html
Police have long been able to search people without a warrant at the time of their arrest. Two cases before the Supreme Court ask whether cellphones should be off-limits until police get permission.
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Radley also questioned by twit why I wasn't more open to embracing the ideas proffered by Glenn Reynolds and Conor Friedersdorf, "And it's probably more productive to engage, persuade new allies than to shun and mock them." Since I hate to be a shunner or mocker, and I try to be relatively informative as reflected in this response to Radley's query, I look forward to Reynolds and Friedersdorf, our new allies, engaging. Engage away, guys. Your turn.
While Instapundit is a Big Kahuna on the interwebz and among academics, George Will has a soap box that dwarfs Reynolds. And he's taken Reynolds' "ideas" mainstream, not only crediting Reynolds for his position as an academic, but taking for granted that he's got criminal law chops. It's unlikely that George checked Reynolds out at Tennessee Law School, where he teaches Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Law, Science, and Technology, Space Law, Internet Law. See criminal law in there? See anything in his past to suggest even a passing familiarity with the actual practice of criminal law? Me neither.The House Judiciary Committee has created an Over-Criminalization Task Force. Its members should read “Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent,” by Harvey Silverglate, a libertarian lawyer whose book argues that prosecutors could indict most of us for three felonies a day. And the task force should read the short essay “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime” by Glenn Harlan Reynolds, a professor of law at the University of Tennessee. Given the axiom that a competent prosecutor can persuade a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich, and given the reality of prosecutorial abuse — particularly, compelling plea bargains by overcharging with “kitchen sink” indictments — Reynolds believes “the decision to charge a person criminally should itself undergo some degree of due process scrutiny.”
He also suggests banning plea bargains: “An understanding that every criminal charge filed would have to be either backed up in open court or ignominiously dropped would significantly reduce the incentive to overcharge. . . . Our criminal justice system, as presently practiced, is basically a plea-bargain system with actual trials of guilt or innocence a bit of showy froth floating on top.”
Much of Instapundit's content consists of links to other sites, often with brief comments. (His frequent use of "heh," "indeed," and "read the whole thing" have been widely imitated and are often parodied by other bloggers.) Reynolds encourages readers to explore the wider blogosphere and to fully read articles and posts to which he links.And that's the foundation for being a major player on the internet.
Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/10/how-bad-ideas-grow-legs.aspx?ref=rss
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This morning the US Supreme Court decided - on a 5-4 vote - that pharmaceutical sales representatives are "outside salesmen" and therefore exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court also unanimously held that the Department of Labor's recently-announced contrary interpretation was entitled to exactly zero deference.
Christopher v. SmithKline Beacham (US Supreme Ct 06/18/2012)
Christopher, a pharmaceutical sales representative, sued the employer for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) alleging failure to pay overtime. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and denied Christopher's motion to amend the judgment based on the trial court's failure to consider an amicus brief filed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor (DOL). The 9th Circuit affirmed. The US Supreme Court affirmed (5-4).
The job of a pharmaceutical sales representative is to try to persuade physicians to write prescriptions for products in appropriate cases. For over 70 years DOL acquiesced in an interpretation that they were "outside salesmen" who are exempt from FLSA overtime requirements. In amicus briefs filed in Circuit courts DOL took the position that a "sale" requires a "consummated transaction." In Supreme Court briefing DOL's position was that there is no "sale" unless the employee "actually transfers title."
The Court said that the DOL's new interpretation is entitled to no deference at all because it would impose massive liability for conduct that occurred before the interpretation was announced, there had been no enforcement actions suggesting the industry was acting unlawfully, DOL gave no opportunity for public comment, and the interpretation is "flatly inconsistent" with the FLSA.
The FLSA definition of "sale" includes consignments, which do not involve a transfer of title. Although DOL regulations say that sales include the transfer of title, that does not mean a sale must include a transfer of title. The regulations also use the phrase "other disposition" which - in this unique regulatory environment - includes the work of pharmaceutical sales representatives. The representatives also bear all the exterior indicia of salesmen (average salaries exceeding $70,000, work that is difficult to standardize to a particular time frame, etc.)
The DISSENT reasoned that sales of drugs are made by pharmacists, not pharmaceutical sales representatives. The pharmaceutical sales representative neither make sales nor promote "their own sales." (The dissent agreed that the DOL's current views expressed in briefs are not entitled to any weight.)
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/06/pharma_sales_re.html
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Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202637622472?rss=rss_nlj
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Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202631180267?rss=rss_nlj
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In In re Answers Corp. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 6170-VCN, 2014 WL 463163 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2014), the Delaware Court of Chancery (Noble, V.C.) granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in a stockholder class action for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the merger of Answers Corporation (“Answers” or the “Company”) with AFCV Holdings, LLC (“AFCV”). Because the undisputed material facts showed that a disinterested majority of the Board of Directors approved the transaction, plaintiffs were required to offer evidence that the Board consciously acted in bad faith or was controlled by an interested party to survive summary judgment. Plaintiffs were unable to do so. The Answers decision highlights the high burden stockholder plaintiffs face to proceed with breach of fiduciary duty claims where a merger is approved by an independent/non-controlled board, even where the sale process may have been flawed. As the court explained, there is a vast difference between “a flawed inadequate effort to carry out fiduciary duties and a conscious disregard for them.”
Answers was a publicly traded Delaware corporation focused on the questions and answers space online. Approximately 90% of the website’s traffic and 75% of its revenue came from Google. In March 2010, AFCV, a portfolio company of a private equity firm with a focus on social media and online information resources, submitted an expression of interest to members of the Answers board concerning a possible business combination. In September 2010, AFCV sent Robert Rosenschein, the Company’s CEO, a letter of intent proposing to acquire Answers for between $7.50 and $8.25 per share. The Board eventually obtained an offer of $10.25 per share, but refused to grant AFCV exclusivity while it continued to evaluate other alternatives and strategic buyers.
While negotiations were proceeding, the Company’s financial conditions improved significantly when Answers announced its fourth quarter results for 2010. In January 2011, the financing committee of the Board recommended attempting to increase the offer price beyond the pending $10.25 per share, but to accept that amount if no further concessions on price were obtained. AFCV responded with its best and final offer at $10.50 per share. After noting that there were no other offers of the table and recognizing that Google continued to significantly threaten the Company’s core business, the Board unanimously approved the proposed transaction.
Shortly after the announcement of the merger agreement, several stockholder plaintiffs filed complaints in the Delaware Court of Chancery challenging the transaction. Plaintiffs alleged that Rosenschein (and two other directors) were conflicted and controlled the negotiation process. Plaintiffs also alleged that the members of the Board breached its fiduciary duties by acting in bad faith to sell Answers before its rising stock price would exceed AFCV’s offer by (1) purposefully engaging in a limited shopping process, (2) failing to act in the interest of the Company’s public stockholders after circumstances had changed to indicate the offer price was too low and (3) exerting willful blindness by ignoring alternatives to the AFCV transaction.
The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court recognized that a disinterested majority of the Board approved the transaction. Thus, to survive summary judgment, plaintiffs were required to show that the Board consciously acted in bad faith or that it was controlled by an interested party. Plaintiffs failed to do so. The directors submitted evidence that they fielded a variety of unsolicited offers and participated in numerous meetings where they discussed transaction alternatives. Despite discussions with at least seven other possible acquirers, nobody else made a credible offer to acquire Answers. The directors also caused the Company’s financial advisor to perform a market check. Moreover, the directors actively negotiated with AFCV on price. This evidence undermined any assertion of bad faith.
The court discounted plaintiffs’ contention than an email where a director stated that the value of Answers could be as much as $1.50 higher than AFCV’s $10.25 offer price showed “bad-faith” by recognizing that the Board had plausible business concerns regarding the stability and future success of the Company tied to its reliance upon Google for traffic and revenues. Plaintiffs also ignored the fact that the Board secured additional merger consideration as a result of the Company’s improving financial condition. As the court explained:
Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Evidence based upon a few isolated quotes stating the deal was accelerated or reflecting one director’s belief, or perhaps mere bargaining position, of the Company’s value does not state a claim for bad faith in this context. Such considerations are within the purview of a disinterested Board . . . . [N]o allegations have been made concerning the Board’s motives for favoring AFCV as a bidder or presenting some other motive for failing to maximize shareholder value.
Ultimately, although plaintiffs argued a “variety of ways in which they believe the process could have been better conducted, they offer no evidence of that extreme set of facts required to show that the board utterly failed to comply with its duties.”
The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that Rosenschein and two other directors dominated and controlled the Board to such a degree as to render it not independent.
The decision in Answers confirms that stockholders bear a high burden when challenging a disinterested/non-controlled board’s decision to approve a strategic transaction. When faced with non-exculpated duty of loyalty claims, Delaware courts will accept a less-than-optimal shop process as long as the directors did not act with a “conscious disregard” of their duty under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) [see generally here] to maximize stockholder value in a change-in-control transaction.
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In today’s newspaper, Don J. DeBenedictis, staff writer for the Journal, discusses law schools’ new approach to help law school graduates find jobs. This idea is one of several being discussed to match the supply and demand of legal services. It is clear that there is a greater demand for legal services than is now being fulfilled. However, many contend there is an oversupply of lawyers. Some writers suggest, I believe correctly, that there is not an oversupply, but rather a mismatch between the two.
One reason for the mismatch is that most lawyers seek to work for the smaller percentage of affluent clients. Working for the less affluent client requires a reduced level of compensation. Sometimes it is difficult to match the reduced remuneration working from low to modest means clients with the debt level resulting from educational expenses.
The staff writer discusses law schools in California that are now providing funds to graduates who are willing to work for government or public interest employers. The amount of money received by the graduates is not grand. We’re talking about, perhaps, $15 per hour. However, the graduates are earning enough money to pay expenses and gain valuable experience preparatory for their next job. This program reminds me of one Southern law school that provided sufficient funds to open a new law practice if the graduate located in a rural or other geographic community that needed legal services. Provided the graduate remained in that location for five years, the “loan” would be forgiven.
It seems that any suggestion brings out adversaries. The positive side of seeking to match supply and demand is countered by those who say that law schools are merely disguising their percentage of graduates employed. While this may be true, it is also true that these graduates are employed, just not at a high level of income written about by the sensationalist media. It is also true that American Bar Association statistics separate between traditional jobs and “funded” jobs, thus disclosing the truth of the employment claims made by law schools.
One could also look at this as a postgraduate fellowship. This is an incredibly positive effort on the part of law schools and their funding sources for this program. My congratulations.
Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/RgkshQhBz3E/
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Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202634055202?rss=rss_nlj
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Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202631180267?rss=rss_nlj
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The Washington State Supreme Court held today that a sexual orientation discrimination amendment adopted in 2006 is not retroactive.
The court also concluded that conduct that took place prior to the amendment is admissible background evidence to prove the discriminatory nature of certain conduct occurring after the amendment.
Loeffelholz v. Univ of Washington (Washington 09/13/2012)
Loeffelholz sued under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) claiming discrimination based on sexual orientation. WLAD was amended in 2006 to include sexual orientation as a protected class, and Loeffelholz alleged several pre-amendment acts and one post-amendment act.
The Washington Supreme Court held that (1) the WLAD amendment is not retroactive and the pre-amendment conduct is not actionable as it was not unlawful when it occurred, and (2) the post-amendment allegedly discriminatory comment is arguably similar enough to the pre-amendment conduct to survive summary judgment.
Loeffelholz alleged that her supervisor between 2003 and June 2006 maintained a hostile work environment based on sexual orientation. This was prior to the WLAD amendment. Loeffelholz also alleged a single act of discrimination by this supervisor after the WLAD amendment.
The court's findings:
(1) Pre-amendment conduct is not actionable. Retroactive application of the amendment would violate the employer's due process rights. The plain language of the amendment and its legislative history indicate only prospective application.
(2) Pre-amendment conduct is admissible as background evidence to prove why the post-amendment conduct is discriminatory.
(3) The post-amendment conduct was a single statement by Loeffelholz's supervisor, who was about to be deployed to Iraq, that he was "going to come back a very angry man." The court found that a reasonable jury could infer that this comment was a natural extension of pre-amendment conduct - the supervisor's dislike of lesbians and his anger management problems as illustrated by his comments that he had a volatile temper and kept a gun. This is enough to preclude summary judgment.
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/09/washingtons_sex.html
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Source: http://ringlerradio.com/podcasts/ringler-radio/2014/02/trial-lawyers-and-structured-settlements/
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Yesterday, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in the challenge to the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule. We have reviewed the D.C. Court of Appeals decision and find that it leaves much of the SEC’s rule intact. It is specifically the requirement that companies describe products as not “DRC conflict free” in their SEC filings and on their website that the Court held constitutes “compelled speech” in violation of the First Amendment. In the words of the Court: “Products and minerals do not fight conflicts. The label ‘conflict free’ is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted. . . . By compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with that exercise of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment.”
The Court of Appeals upheld the other elements of the SEC Final Rule, however, and rejected the petitioners’ arguments about the absence of a de minimis exception and the SEC’s application of the rule to companies that only contract to manufacture products. The decision therefore leaves intact the requirement for the issuer to conduct a “reasonable country of origin inquiry,” exercise “due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals” and file a conflict minerals report in the circumstances specified in the rule. Under the DC Circuit decision, however, an issuer cannot be required to describe its products as “not DRC conflict free” in its report. The Court of Appeals suggested that issuers use their own language to describe their products and also invited the SEC to consider publishing a centralized list of products that it believes are affiliated with the Congo war based on information that issuers submit.
The case could be consolidated and reheard en banc with the unrelated case related to meat labelling requirements that raises a similar First Amendment issue. It is also possible that the SEC could stay its rule until the appellate process is completed. As of this writing there has been no word yet from the SEC.
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The US Supreme Court this morning held that "when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative consent."
Knox v. Service Employees Intl Union (US Supreme Ct 06/21/2012)
This is a remarkable decision for two reasons.
First, the Court has never before held that unions must issue a Hudson notice before changing the amount of dues. Hudson notices have always been based on an after-the-fact look-back based on the previous year's audited accounts.Second, the Court has never before held that unions cannot collect fees from nonmembers unless they affirmatively opt in. The Hudson notice system has always been based on the idea that nonmembers can get an after-the-fact refund.
The union representing California public sector employees has an agency shop agreement which requires nonmembers to pay an annual fee for "chargeable" expenses - nonpolitical costs related to collective bargaining. In June 2005 the union sent out its annual Hudson notice which estimated that chargeable expenses would be 56.35% of its total expenditures. After the 30-day period that nonmembers had to object, the union announced a 25% increase to fund a broad range of political expenses, but nonmembers were given no choice as to whether they would pay into this fund.
The US Supreme Court held (7-2) that
"when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative consent."
The Court described this case as one involving compelled funding of the speech of other private speakers or groups, which is akin to compelled speech and compelled association. Therefore, it is subject to "exacting First Amendment scrutiny." In order to prevent the union from extracting a loan from unwilling nonmembers, the union must issue a fresh Hudson notice and must exempt nonmembers unless they opt in.
Two Justices, CONCURRING in the judgment, criticized the majority for adopting an opt-in system of fee collection which was "not contained in the questions presented, briefed, or argued."
Two Justices, DISSENTING, pointed out that unions have always been allowed to calculate each year's fee based on its expenses during the previous year. Although an imperfect system, it is not unconstitutional.
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/06/midyear_union_d.html
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If you are prone to occasionally jostling, you’ll want to stay out of Topeka, Kansas. Why? The long (non-jostling) arm of the law, that’s why. From the Topeka Municipal Code:
9.45.060 Jostling, crowding.
It shall be unlawful to be found jostling or roughly crowding or pushing any person in any public place.
Lest you think The Juice is making this up, click here and search “jostling”. (The “search” box is in the upper right corner.)
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/bxkJGZR30IQ/21353.html
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/digital-edge/2014/01/acrobat-tips-tricks-lawyers
Appellants and amici briefs are now in at the Third Circuit on the appeal of Andrew Auernheimer's conviction for somehow violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. I say "somehow" as the government was never pinned down on whether it was exceeding authorized access or unauthorized access. But they were clear that what he did was wrong, wrong enough to get him convicted and sentence to 41 months imprisonment.
Weev didn't help himself. Whether he wanted to be a martyr to the cause of geekdom or just unwilling to win except on his terms isn't clear. But his lawyer, Tor Eckland, couldn't control him, and had enough on his hands trying to defend Weev in what I believe to be his first trial*. While the prosecution was huge within the computer hacker community, it didn't garner the attention of Lori Drew's prosecution, lacking a dead child. But make no mistake, Weev's prosecution raises issues of monumental significance for all computer users.
Orin Kerr, who joined the defense team on appeal, gives a summary of the case.
Here are the basic facts. When iPads were first released, iPad owners could sign up for Internet access using AT&T. When they signed up, they gave AT&T their e-mail addresses. AT&T decided to configure their webservers to “pre load” those e-mail addresses when it recognized the registered iPads that visited its website. When an iPad owner would visit the AT&T website, the browser would automatically visit a specific URL associated with its own ID number; when that URL was visited, the webserver would open a pop-up window that was preloaded with the e-mail address associated with that iPad.
The basic idea was to make it easier for users to log in to AT&T’s website: The user’s e-mail address would automatically appear in the pop-up window, so users only needed to enter in their passwords to access their account. But this practice effectively published the e-mail addresses on the web. You just needed to visit the right publicly-available URL to see a particular user’s e-mail address. Spitler realized this, and he wrote a script to visit AT&T’s website with the different URLs and thereby collect lots of different e-mail addresses of iPad owners. And they ended up collecting a lot of e-mail addresses — around 114,000 different addresses — that they then disclosed to a reporter. Importantly, however, only e-mail addresses were obtained. No names or passwords were obtained, and no accounts were actually accessed.
Or to put it a bit more succinctly, Weev and Spitler stumbled on pages that were publicly accessible, but AT&T figured no one would find because there was no way to access them other than to have its iPad or, as stumble on them. They then did what geeks do, and exploited their discovery to see how far they could go. Rather than hand it over nicely to AT&T so it could cover its tracks and deny its screw-up, they gave it to a reporter to publish. AT&T was pissed, and the government was happy to prosecute as payback for quick and easy disclosure of your cellular communications the heinous crime of publicly embarrassing AT&T for being a computer idiot.
The appellant's brief, after a disturbing opening to the main argument that repeats the conventional wisdom from 1986 analogizing computers to physical trespass, takes the view that this just isn't a crime. As the pages were public, it cannot be unlawful access. The brief reads more academic than advocate, but does an admirable job of making its points.
There are two amici briefs, one arguing that this is how everybody uses the internet, and the other arguing that this is how sophisticated internet security experts use the internet, both reaching the same conclusion that affirmance of Weev's conviction would criminalize normal and lawful practices.
As everybody else involved relies on analogies, it seems appropriate despite my view that it's critical to stop using real world analogies to explain digital world conduct, to do the same. The prosecution's argument is that just because someone leaves their door unlocked doesn't mean a person can walk in and take what he wants. The defense argument is that when someone leaves their stuff in front of a picture window, passersby commit no crime by looking in and seeing what the person put on display. Neither analogy strikes me as fully satisfying.
The question for the rest of us is where the line is drawn between lawful and unlawful conduct based on a law crafted at the birth of public computer use and before there was any world wide web to consider. The language of the CFAA fails miserably to provide an answer, and there is certainly no "originalist" view since there was no internet in existence. What we are left with is empty, meaningless language being shoehorned into technology that didn't exist. It might have seemed like a good idea back in 1986, but we're paying for it now.
Nonetheless, Congress can't be bothered to do its job of crafting a law that might apply, and the court is left with trying to decipher criminality from inapt words and their limited grasp of how the tubes work (or that of their kids, their law clerks, or maybe the kid down the street).
The prosecution has a huge glaring hole that needs answering: Is there any middle ground for a URL that can be accessed without hacking a password but is otherwise not intended to be found, accessed or used except by a discrete, chosen group of users? The government wants the crime to depend on the subjective and transitory intent of the website owner, where "unauthorized" is defined as undesired. The defense wants a brightline test that says if it can be publicly accessed, then there can be no crime.
The government's position is not only untenable, but presents a threat to users that can't be tolerated. And indeed, it's so highly subjective, and selective, that it ignores that Google et al. violate it constantly with impunity. Do we want cookies and bots crawling all over us, capturing our personal info to feed back to people so they can sell us crap? I don't think so. But it prevailed below anyway.
The problem now is that the burdens shift on appeal, and it's the appellant's position that will be subject to scrutiny. Is there no limit to what we can access on the internet, as long as we don't hack the password? What if all the surrounding circumstances leave us with no doubt that the website owner doesn't want anybody coming in uninvited, so that no reasonable person can not be aware that he's entering a URL where he isn't welcome? Is that still okay?
Since the lines are drawn at polar extremes, and the arguments remain couched in poor analogies, and the judges will have a terrible time getting into the mindset of sophisticated computer users who think nothing of screwing around with user agents to see what they can find, and Weev felt compelled to handle himself in the typical, snarky, computer whizkid way that tends to just piss the crap out of everybody who isn't a snarky computer whizkid, this is going to be a tough fight.
But there remains one detail that I would have pounded hard, far harder than either the appellant or amici. Fair notice requires that the language of the CFAA, for smarter or stupider, state clearly what constitutes criminal conduct so that a person will know what not to do. By the Rule of Lenity, the failure of the law to adequately define a crime given the state of technology as it currently exists must resolve all ambiguities in favor of the defendant.
While no one knows what Congress might do if it is forced to recraft the CFAA, and they could make it even worse, what seems clear now is that it is far too unclear to imprison anyone whose conduct falls within that middle ground of not hacking a password and breaking through a brick wall. Maybe they would criminalize what happened here, but until the law makes clear where the line is drawn, the government can't just make it up at will. And the Third Circuit should not be so activist as to give a 2013 meaning to a 1986 law that the government pulls out of its butt to nail Weev.
Weev's conviction must be reversed, despite his attitude and mouth, because the rest of us used the internet too and if Weev is a criminal, so too are we all.
* I hasten to add, lest anyone think otherwise, that I think Tor did an exceptional job with this case, even the more remarkable given the circumstances.
Update: Via Volokh, the amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has just become available. While I'm still going through it, my initial impression is that it's excellent, and fills in some of the gaps in the other briefs. Notably, putting them all together, the argument on behalf of Weev is overwhelming.
Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/09/its-not-easy-being-weev.aspx?ref=rss
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Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202473966828&rss=rss_ltn
Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202636876934?rss=rss_nlj
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Ed discusses how increase your value by understanding what is most important to your clients.
Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/rndSR0JE53s/
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It would be misleading, though not totally false, to say this guy walked into a Florida Papa John’s and stole pizza. Here’s what happened, per wptv.com:
Polk County deputies say a man walked into Papa John’s Pizza restaurant, put on a pizza costume, and then walked out of the Lakeland restaurant Sunday evening.
You stole a pizza costume? The Juice is guessing you didn’t know they have video cameras in the store.
Detectives say a white man, perhaps 18 years old, entered the restaurant with six others, wearing a white button-up shirt, dark pants and a dark tie. He put the costume on and left the store wearing it.
The costume is described as approximately six feet tall, and looks like a giant slice of pizza with pepperoni, mushrooms, green peppers and black olives.
Video surveillance shows the images of the suspect and four persons of interest. They are described as three older white males with dark hair. One had a full beard. The fourth person of interest is described as a white female with dark hair.
Here’s the source, including a photo.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/yBdzCmJPclY/asdf-20.html
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