Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/legal-toolkit/2012/06/legal-translation-services-for-law-firms/
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/legal-toolkit/2012/06/legal-translation-services-for-law-firms/
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The 1st Circuit today held that the Defense of Marriage Act's denial of federal benefits to married same-sex couples is unconstitutional. Massachusetts v. US Department of Health and Human Services (1st Cir 05/31/2012).
The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Section 3 prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint tax returns, prevent a surviving spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits, and prevents federal employees from sharing medical benefits with same-sex spouses.
The trial court held that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional; the 1st Circuit affirmed.
The court's decision surveys equal protection and federalism issues and concludes that "governing precedents under both heads combine - not to create some new category of 'heightened scrutiny,' ..., but rather to require a closer than usual review based in part on discrepant impact among married couples and in part on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage."
Thus the court gave less deference to, and "closer scrutiny of government action touching upon minority group interests and of federal action in areas of traditional state concern."
The court concluded that denial of federal benefits to same-sex married couples "has not been adequately supported by any permissible federal interest."
The court stayed its mandate, thus extending the trial court's stay, in anticipation of the losing parties seeking certiorari in the US Supreme Court.
My view:
This is a decision, purportedly based on the US Constitution, that essentially avoids making an explicit connection to the text of the Constitution.
The idea is that states regulate marriage, the federal government may have something to say in this regard, but the reasons behind the federal government's actions didn't have enough oomph. No, there's no 10th amendment violation, and no violation of the Spending Clause. And no, there's no "strict scrutiny" going on. And no "new category of 'heightened scrutiny.'" But wait, let's give the legislation "closer scrutiny."
I'm no fan of DOMA, but it's not really clear to me what this court is doing.
[By the way, similar DOMA issues are pending in the 9th Circuit.]
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/05/doma_down_but_w.html
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The recent United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Windsor invalidated Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which had defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. The ruling greatly expands the estate planning techniques available for married same-sex couples who live in a state like California that recognizes same-sex marriage. These include:
Other items to consider:
Even if the Windsor decision does not apply to you, it is important that you review your estate plan in light of the “permanent” transfer tax relief passed by Congress earlier this year.
For further information, please contact Lauren Liebes (213-617-5444, lliebes@sheppardmullin.com).
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A federal appeals court said Tuesday that it would not dismiss a lawsuit accusing Google of wrongly collecting people's data and online activities through its Wi-Fi systems as its Street View cars crisscrossed the world.
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/legal-toolkit/2012/08/content-marketing-for-lawyers/
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David Hughart is now the highest-ranking former executive of Massey Energy to go to jail for crimes related to the worst coal mine disaster in 40 years.
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/suffolk-law/2012/06/ip-industries-part-two/
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In Dennis v. Hart, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15648 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs’ “say-on-pay” shareholder derivative suits alleging breach of fiduciary duty were improperly removed to federal court, vacated the district court’s decisions and dismissed the parties’ cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear the action because defendants had held an advisory vote in compliance with the federal Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1, and plaintiffs had only alleged state law causes of action. This holding indicates that challenges to board actions in response to “say-on-pay” votes are not enough to confer federal jurisdiction without additional, specific violations of federal law.
Plaintiffs alleged that in 2010, despite reporting negative net income and free cash flow, the board of directors of PICO Holdings, Inc. (“PICO”) increased executive compensation. In a Dodd-Frank Act-mandated advisory vote held in May 2011, 61% of PICO’s shareholders voted against the proposed 2010 compensation package. The board, however, took no action in response to the vote. Shareholders later filed derivative actions in California state court against PICO and its board members. Plaintiff Ronald Dennis asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, gross mismanagement, contribution and indemnification, and unjust enrichment. He also requested a declaration “that the adverse May 13, 2011 shareholder vote on the PICO Board’s executive compensation rebutted the business judgment surrounding the PICO Board’s decisions to increase executive compensation.” Plaintiff George Assad asserted claims for unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty relating to the Board’s issuance of false and misleading statements, compensation practices, and the Board’s lack of response to the say-on-pay vote.
Defendants removed the actions to federal court, and moved to dismiss. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the request for declaratory judgment in Dennis for failure to state a claim, and determined the remaining claims should be remanded to state court. In Assad, the district court dismissed the breach of fiduciary claim due to the failure to respond to the say-on-pay vote, and determined the remaining claims should be remanded to state court. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than remand the cases to state court. The Ninth Circuit addressed and dismissed three potential avenues for defendants to assert federal jurisdiction: (1) Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, (2) the “significant federal issue” rule and (3) the complete preemption doctrine.
Defendants first argued that Section 27 of the 1934 Act provided the federal court with jurisdiction because Section 27 “vests federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over actions ‘brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the 1934 Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder.’” However, the Ninth Circuit held that “[n]othing in either complaint alleges any . . . violation of the say-on-pay provision or any other provision of the [1934] Act. On the contrary, the parties agree that PICO did what the Act requires: it held a vote.” The Court disagreed with defendants’ reliance on Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998), holding that while “Sparta’s complaint sought relief based upon violation of exchange rules[,]” plaintiffs here acknowledge that PICO complied with the act and instead only allege state law violations.
Defendants next argued that because Congress went to great lengths to ensure that say-on-pay votes were considered only advisory and would not create any new causes of action, Congress’ “desire to preclude liability” is a significant federal issue that confers jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit again disagreed, holding that while defendants likely had a “very strong federal defense,” a federal defense does not confer federal jurisdiction.
Defendants finally argued that the doctrine of complete preemption conferred federal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit disagreed once again, holding that “[c]omplete preemption is a limited doctrine that applies only where a federal statutory scheme is so comprehensive that it entirely supplants state law causes of action.” The Court held that “[n]othing in the [1934] Act . . . specifically suggests that Congress intended to totally displace state law. On the contrary, we have recognized that the [1934] Act does not so fully displace state law as to invoke complete preemption.” The Court also noted that complete preemption did not apply because (1) the parties agreed that plaintiffs had not alleged a federal cause of action and (2) the Dodd-Frank Act expressly “created no new fiduciary duties and explicitly preserved existing state laws.”
Although this decision appears to limit the ability of defendants to remove to federal court claims attacking board responses to Dodd-Frank Act “say-on-pay” votes, it does not address other bases for removal, such as the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2). With the flood of “say-on-pay” cases receding over the past twelve months, the question of federal jurisdiction over “say-on-pay” cases may become less significant.
For further information, please contact John Stigi at (310) 228-3717 or Whitney Fair at (213) 617-5436.
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/legal-toolkit/2013/04/desktop-as-a-service-for-lawyers
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/2013/04/nourishing-creativity-with-constraints
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/un-billable-hour/2012/08/the-ipad-practice/
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Today Ed takes on your questions! Based on a comment from a Facebook fan, he explores whether incentive-based compensation exists for lawyers.
Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/q-23lAsXXxE/
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If you're thinking "gifts" you would be wrong. As reported by The Northwest Florida Daily News (which The Juice somehow missed before):
According to the Fort Walton Beach arrest report, the couple was arguing inside of the bathroom of their residence on Windsor Lane on Dec. 8 when the husband asked the woman to leave the room so he could urinate. He threatened to urinate on his wife if she did not leave.Oh no you didn't.
She refused and the husband turned toward the wife and urinated on her, according to the report.Nasty.
The wife shoved the husband and told him to stop several times then began to hit the man on the shoulder causing him to stop.
The man was charged with a misdemeanor domestic violence battery.Here's the source.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/vs44-YmKKDU/post_767.html
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Appellants and amici briefs are now in at the Third Circuit on the appeal of Andrew Auernheimer's conviction for somehow violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. I say "somehow" as the government was never pinned down on whether it was exceeding authorized access or unauthorized access. But they were clear that what he did was wrong, wrong enough to get him convicted and sentence to 41 months imprisonment.
Weev didn't help himself. Whether he wanted to be a martyr to the cause of geekdom or just unwilling to win except on his terms isn't clear. But his lawyer, Tor Eckland, couldn't control him, and had enough on his hands trying to defend Weev in what I believe to be his first trial*. While the prosecution was huge within the computer hacker community, it didn't garner the attention of Lori Drew's prosecution, lacking a dead child. But make no mistake, Weev's prosecution raises issues of monumental significance for all computer users.
Orin Kerr, who joined the defense team on appeal, gives a summary of the case.
Here are the basic facts. When iPads were first released, iPad owners could sign up for Internet access using AT&T. When they signed up, they gave AT&T their e-mail addresses. AT&T decided to configure their webservers to “pre load” those e-mail addresses when it recognized the registered iPads that visited its website. When an iPad owner would visit the AT&T website, the browser would automatically visit a specific URL associated with its own ID number; when that URL was visited, the webserver would open a pop-up window that was preloaded with the e-mail address associated with that iPad.
The basic idea was to make it easier for users to log in to AT&T’s website: The user’s e-mail address would automatically appear in the pop-up window, so users only needed to enter in their passwords to access their account. But this practice effectively published the e-mail addresses on the web. You just needed to visit the right publicly-available URL to see a particular user’s e-mail address. Spitler realized this, and he wrote a script to visit AT&T’s website with the different URLs and thereby collect lots of different e-mail addresses of iPad owners. And they ended up collecting a lot of e-mail addresses — around 114,000 different addresses — that they then disclosed to a reporter. Importantly, however, only e-mail addresses were obtained. No names or passwords were obtained, and no accounts were actually accessed.
Or to put it a bit more succinctly, Weev and Spitler stumbled on pages that were publicly accessible, but AT&T figured no one would find because there was no way to access them other than to have its iPad or, as stumble on them. They then did what geeks do, and exploited their discovery to see how far they could go. Rather than hand it over nicely to AT&T so it could cover its tracks and deny its screw-up, they gave it to a reporter to publish. AT&T was pissed, and the government was happy to prosecute as payback for quick and easy disclosure of your cellular communications the heinous crime of publicly embarrassing AT&T for being a computer idiot.
The appellant's brief, after a disturbing opening to the main argument that repeats the conventional wisdom from 1986 analogizing computers to physical trespass, takes the view that this just isn't a crime. As the pages were public, it cannot be unlawful access. The brief reads more academic than advocate, but does an admirable job of making its points.
There are two amici briefs, one arguing that this is how everybody uses the internet, and the other arguing that this is how sophisticated internet security experts use the internet, both reaching the same conclusion that affirmance of Weev's conviction would criminalize normal and lawful practices.
As everybody else involved relies on analogies, it seems appropriate despite my view that it's critical to stop using real world analogies to explain digital world conduct, to do the same. The prosecution's argument is that just because someone leaves their door unlocked doesn't mean a person can walk in and take what he wants. The defense argument is that when someone leaves their stuff in front of a picture window, passersby commit no crime by looking in and seeing what the person put on display. Neither analogy strikes me as fully satisfying.
The question for the rest of us is where the line is drawn between lawful and unlawful conduct based on a law crafted at the birth of public computer use and before there was any world wide web to consider. The language of the CFAA fails miserably to provide an answer, and there is certainly no "originalist" view since there was no internet in existence. What we are left with is empty, meaningless language being shoehorned into technology that didn't exist. It might have seemed like a good idea back in 1986, but we're paying for it now.
Nonetheless, Congress can't be bothered to do its job of crafting a law that might apply, and the court is left with trying to decipher criminality from inapt words and their limited grasp of how the tubes work (or that of their kids, their law clerks, or maybe the kid down the street).
The prosecution has a huge glaring hole that needs answering: Is there any middle ground for a URL that can be accessed without hacking a password but is otherwise not intended to be found, accessed or used except by a discrete, chosen group of users? The government wants the crime to depend on the subjective and transitory intent of the website owner, where "unauthorized" is defined as undesired. The defense wants a brightline test that says if it can be publicly accessed, then there can be no crime.
The government's position is not only untenable, but presents a threat to users that can't be tolerated. And indeed, it's so highly subjective, and selective, that it ignores that Google et al. violate it constantly with impunity. Do we want cookies and bots crawling all over us, capturing our personal info to feed back to people so they can sell us crap? I don't think so. But it prevailed below anyway.
The problem now is that the burdens shift on appeal, and it's the appellant's position that will be subject to scrutiny. Is there no limit to what we can access on the internet, as long as we don't hack the password? What if all the surrounding circumstances leave us with no doubt that the website owner doesn't want anybody coming in uninvited, so that no reasonable person can not be aware that he's entering a URL where he isn't welcome? Is that still okay?
Since the lines are drawn at polar extremes, and the arguments remain couched in poor analogies, and the judges will have a terrible time getting into the mindset of sophisticated computer users who think nothing of screwing around with user agents to see what they can find, and Weev felt compelled to handle himself in the typical, snarky, computer whizkid way that tends to just piss the crap out of everybody who isn't a snarky computer whizkid, this is going to be a tough fight.
But there remains one detail that I would have pounded hard, far harder than either the appellant or amici. Fair notice requires that the language of the CFAA, for smarter or stupider, state clearly what constitutes criminal conduct so that a person will know what not to do. By the Rule of Lenity, the failure of the law to adequately define a crime given the state of technology as it currently exists must resolve all ambiguities in favor of the defendant.
While no one knows what Congress might do if it is forced to recraft the CFAA, and they could make it even worse, what seems clear now is that it is far too unclear to imprison anyone whose conduct falls within that middle ground of not hacking a password and breaking through a brick wall. Maybe they would criminalize what happened here, but until the law makes clear where the line is drawn, the government can't just make it up at will. And the Third Circuit should not be so activist as to give a 2013 meaning to a 1986 law that the government pulls out of its butt to nail Weev.
Weev's conviction must be reversed, despite his attitude and mouth, because the rest of us used the internet too and if Weev is a criminal, so too are we all.
* I hasten to add, lest anyone think otherwise, that I think Tor did an exceptional job with this case, even the more remarkable given the circumstances.
Update: Via Volokh, the amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has just become available. While I'm still going through it, my initial impression is that it's excellent, and fills in some of the gaps in the other briefs. Notably, putting them all together, the argument on behalf of Weev is overwhelming.
Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/09/its-not-easy-being-weev.aspx?ref=rss
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/paralegal-voice/2013/05/paralegal-hiring-trends
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/ringler-radio/2012/08/why-go-with-a-structured-settlement/
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It's not always good to keep it in the family. See, it all depends on what "it" is. This, the family could have done without. As reported by ksat.com (San Antonio, Texas):
A man is accused of robbing from a popular West Side restaurant that is owned by his brother-in-law. Felipe Barron Jr., 53, is charged with robbery.Yup.
According to an arrest affidavit, Barron was caught stealing cash from the safe at Ray's Drive Inn located in the 800 block of SW 19th street back in April.
The affidavit stated the owner saw Barron closing a safe and confronted him inside the restaurant because Barron was not authorized to be there or employed there.
The affidavit stated Barron tried to run away but was chased by the owner. Barron then struck the owner in the chest before fleeing on foot.So much for Thanksgiving Dinner. Here's the source, including a mug shot.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/tcVRlYuUkuM/post_762.html
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/new-solo/2012/10/starting-your-own-bankruptcy-practice/
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If you're thinking "gifts" you would be wrong. As reported by The Northwest Florida Daily News (which The Juice somehow missed before):
According to the Fort Walton Beach arrest report, the couple was arguing inside of the bathroom of their residence on Windsor Lane on Dec. 8 when the husband asked the woman to leave the room so he could urinate. He threatened to urinate on his wife if she did not leave.Oh no you didn't.
She refused and the husband turned toward the wife and urinated on her, according to the report.Nasty.
The wife shoved the husband and told him to stop several times then began to hit the man on the shoulder causing him to stop.
The man was charged with a misdemeanor domestic violence battery.Here's the source.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/vs44-YmKKDU/post_767.html
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One of the firm's core strengths, our Corporate practice, assists clients throughout the United States and abroad in maximizing their business opportunities. We represent clients that range from private to public companies and from startups and emerging businesses to international corporations. We are proud to offer CRADLE TO LIQUIDITY® services.
We provide general business legal advice, assist in structuring and implementing major transactions, prepare agreements to address unique business arrangements and consult with clients to resolve major business and ownership issues. We handle such matters as initial and later stage venture and other financings; leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations; public offerings; mergers and acquisitions; SEC compliance; private equity transactions; real estate capital markets transactions; corporate, LLC and partnership formation; and corporate partnering, joint venture and other strategic alliance arrangements. Because of our diverse client base, we have experience representing substantial entities in complicated multinational and multi-state transactions, as well as advising smaller and emerging clients on the full spectrum of business matters.
Source:
http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/practice-corporate.html
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Me? Urinating in public? Well I never! Okay, maybe just this once ... or, maybe not. As reported by The Iowa City Press-Citizen:
An Iowa City Man was arrested for public intoxication at 10:40 p.m. Sunday after telling police the yellow liquid flowing through a handrail on steps leading to an apartment building was beer.Told you it was novel, but ...
... police say they saw the man urinate, pull up his shorts and no beer cans or bottles were located near him, according to a criminal complaint.
A post-arrest breath test showed Connor Thomas Glascott, 19, of 1956A Broadway St., had a blood-alcohol content of .249, according to police.Yikes. That's three times the legal limit in many states.
“The urine was seen flowing through the handrail. The defendant stated he was pouring out a beer,” the criminal complaint states. “There was no open beer can/bottle in the area the defendant was standing.”Click here for the source.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/JrJ-kjcHxlU/post_771.html
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Clark County Sheriff’s deputies are wearing pocket cameras that record their work to help their cases and to protect themselves against accusations of misconduct.So that's how it's going to be, if we record them, they record us. Tit for tat. Fight fire with fire. So nobody in Dayton will be arrested or hassled for videotaping police anymore? What's wrong with that?“Every call we go on, someone’s going to record us,” Clark County Sheriff Gene Kelly said. “We have that same technology.”
Deputies are not required to wear the cameras but can purchase them independently or with their uniform allowance.
Of course, that's not how it worked out when Rory Bruce was tried, but it reveals the one-way street attitude that video is going through on its way to maturity. When the cops want to use it, because it benefits them, it's perfect. A picture is worth a thousand words. When it reflects poorly on cops, it never tells the full story and should be completely disregarded.Kelly said that law enforcement can use the cameras to their benefit if there are false allegations.
“They say a picture is worth a thousand words,” Kelly said.
What Elliott records with his camera can be used for evidence.
“If I feel there are evidentiary purposes, I will submit it to the courts,” said Elliott, who has worn his for about a year.
Members of the Clark County Sheriff’s office are not permitted to have original copies of the digital media evidence after their shifts, according to digital media evidence policies for the office.
And what happens to the deputies if they do? Who decides what gets uploaded after a shift? Is this intended to prevent a deputy from screwing with videos at home or uploading embarrassing videos on Youtube of their interactions on the job?
There probably isn't anyone who disagrees with this, though its hardly as simple as Kelly would have it. We're still a ways off from figuring out how video will best serve "deputies and civilians," ignoring, of course, that deputies are civilians, but I hesitate to be overly critical of Ben Hunt, human resources and labor relations administrator at the Clark County Sheriff’s Office, for his confusion. It's got Tale of Two Cities potential, best and worst at the same time.“They can be used to protect deputies and civilians to be sure everything is safe and appropriate,” Hunt said.
Officials believe that the cameras will be helpful in protecting themselves and the community.
“I think there will be a time when everyone carries one,” said Kelly.
Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/14/fighting-video-with-video.aspx?ref=rss
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Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/new-solo/2012/06/the-path-to-becoming-a-solo-practitioner/
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Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/09/former-prime-minister-silvio-berlusconi.php
Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202618385256&rss=rss_nlj
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Aside: For those unaware, a "knock and talk" is a means of circumventing the warrant requirement by relying on submission to the shield, lies, fear and the possibility that the agents might either see or cause something to happen to give rise to an exception to the warrant requirement that would allow them to enter a home. And yes, it's been held to be perfectly lawful since anyone, cop or Fuller Brush salesman, can knock on your door and say "hi." Or scream "police", as the case may be.According to the testimony, Stephens heard "scurrying and shuffling" inside the apartment upon her knocking on the door, "which immediately caused us concern." A male voice asked who it was, and after he responded "police," there were "loud movements" and a "short delay" before Mongold opened the door. That's when the bad stuff happened.
After the delay, Mr. Mongold, who had been living in the home for several months, opened the door. Agent Stephens smelled marijuana and recognized what he believed were prison tattoos on Mr. Mongold. Agent Stephens asked for Ms. Moore. Mr. Mongold told him that he would go get her and turned to walk to the back of the house to find her. The officers followed him inside even though they did not have permission to enter the house.
Once inside, they saw ammunition. Knowing that Moore was a prior felon, possession of ammunition was a crime, and it went downhill from there. Mongold, Moore and her two adult children subsequently consented to a search of the place, which found drugs and guns.
The defendant moved to suppress before the district court, based on the initial warrantless entry. The government's argument below was that the smell of marijuana, combined with the "prison tats" on Mongold's arm, suggesting that he too was a felon, created a justifiable fear of officer safety, which allowed for Stephens to enter for a protective sweep. The court below also held the entry justified under exigent circumstances to preserve evidence.
The Circuit wasn't as impressed. While the court acknowledged that the smell of marijuana is accepted as a basis to believe there is pot inside, it merely gives rise to a belief that it's basic possession of marijuana.
But that wasn't the only argument. There remained their deep concern for the safety from the smell (yes, I'm being facetious calling it "second hand smoke," because it's unclear whether the smell is smoke or fresh pot, and the opinion really has nothing to do with the second-hand smoke aspect in any event).Based on the foregoing, if marijuana possession is the only crime for which the officers in this case had probable cause, the exigency exception for destruction of evidence should not apply because marijuana possession is not a serious crime.
Even the use of cool active verbs ("scurrying"), curious descriptors ("loud movements") and expressions of deep concern reflecting both the terrible, life-and-death dangers of conducting a "knock and talk" to circumvent the Constitution, didn't sway the court. Instead, the court reached the conclusion of remarkably wisdom: An idea so radical, so outlandish, that it never occurred to either the agents or the prosecutors: walk away. While this might make for good fodder to be chiseled into the lintels over courthouses everywhere, the bad news is that the opinion, while persuasive, is not precedential: At the suppression hearing, Agent Stephens argued that he feared for his and the other officers' safety because the home's owner, Ms. Moore, was a known felon, and he suspected Mr. Mongold was a felon as well, based on his "prison tattoos."
Officer safety is not an alternative ground to affirm because the first element of the test is dispositive. The Government presented no evidence that the officers had "reasonable grounds to believe that there [was] immediate need to protect their lives or others." Before entering the home, the officers had not seen a weapon or any other indication of heightened danger. They could most easily have protected the officers' safety by leaving Ms. Moore's home, not by entering it.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value.
This, of course, means that the next time a second-hand smoke case arises, the district judge may not be willing to adopt such a radical concept as expecting the agents to walk away rather than conduct a warrantless search of a home after smelling marijuana or seeing prison tats, because they're very scary to agents.
And don't discount the possibility that if the odor was of burning pot, the agents would be authorized to break down the door to protect themselves from the second hand smoke. Truth is, this opinion doesn't preclude such a holding at all. It could still happen.
Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/13/officer-safety-and-second-hand-smoke.aspx?ref=rss
The US Supreme Court held this morning that the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) precludes district court jurisdiction over Elgin's claim that his removal from federal service was based on an unconstitutional statute. The procedural route prescribed by the CSRA is by appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and, if dissatisfied with the result, appeal to the Federal Circuit, whose decisions in turn are reviewable by the Supreme Court.
Elgin v. Dept of Treasury (US Supreme Ct 06/11/2012)
A federal statute bars employment in the executive branch of male citizens who failed to register for the draft. Elgin, who had been discharged from his job, first challenged the decision before the MSPB - arguing that the statutory bar was unconstitutional - but an ALJ dismissed his case on the ground that the MSPB lacked authority to review the constitutionality of a federal statute. Rather than appealing from that decision, Elgin sued in federal district court.
The US Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because it is "fairly discernable" from the CSRA's text, structure, and purpose that Congress precluded district court jurisdiction over Elgin's claims. Based on CSRA's text and structure, there is no exception for constitutional challenges to federal statutes. If the MSPB lacks power to hear such claims, they can be meaningfully addressed by the Federal Circuit.
The DISSENT argued that Elgin's "constitutional claims are a far cry from the type of claim that Congress intended to channel through the [MSPB]."
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/06/no_district_cou.html
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Yesterday the second of my recent interviews for MyCase blog with Nicole Black was published.
You can read Part 1, with tips on billing, legal technology, time and case management. In Part 2 we cover marketing, legal technology and planning for retirement.
Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/kisnwrsWIII/
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