Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/06/28/the-am-roundup-all-eyes-on-scotus/?mod=WSJBlog
Saturday, June 30, 2012
In-Vitro Fertilization, Custody Rights and Family Law
Friday, June 29, 2012
What’s Trending in 2012?
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/lawyer-2-lawyer/2012/01/what%E2%80%99s-trending-in-2012/
Thursday, June 28, 2012
Smartphone Security
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/digital-detectives/2012/01/smartphone-security/
Texting While Driving and the Law
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/lawyer-2-lawyer/2012/06/texting-while-driving-and-the-law/
Wednesday, June 27, 2012
An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements
DIY Discovery Trends & the Federal Circuit’s New Model Order on E-Discovery
Tuesday, June 26, 2012
House Moving Toward a Vote This Week on Contempt for Holder
Court Upholds 'Show Me Your Papers' In Arizona
Source: http://www.npr.org/2012/06/25/155717375/-court-upholds-show-me-your-papers-in-arizona?ft=1&f=1070
Monday, June 25, 2012
Continental Breakfast: How Dewey's Management Got One Thing Right
E-discovery Preservation: Reset to Neutral
Sunday, June 24, 2012
Solos, Structured Settlements, & Medicare Set Asides
The Controversy over Cameras in the U.S. Supreme Court
Saturday, June 23, 2012
Space Law and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
Evaluating and Negotiating Workers’ Compensation Claims
Friday, June 22, 2012
First Circuit Holds That Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Extends Only to Employees of Public Companies, Not Employees of Private Companies Who Are Contractors or Subcontractors for Covered Public Companies
In Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 10-2240, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2085 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a case of first impression, held that the whistleblower provision in Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“SOX”), applies only to employees of public companies, and does not protect employees of private companies who are contractors or subcontractors for the covered public company. This decision, the first decision by a United States Court of Appeals on this issue, helps clarify the definition of “covered employee” under whistleblower provisions of SOX.
Plaintiffs Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang each brought separate actions in which they alleged unlawful retaliation by their employers in violation of the whistleblower protections of Section 806 of SOX. Section 806(a) of SOX provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee . . . . ”
The employers of Lawson and Zang were each private companies that provided advising or management services by contract to the Fidelity family of mutual funds. Lawson’s and Zang’s employers each moved to dismiss the claims arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs were not “covered employees” within the meaning of Section 806. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motions, ruling that the SOX whistleblower protection of Section 806 extended to employees of private agents, contractors and subcontractors to public companies. Defendants moved for an interlocutory appeal and the district court certified a “controlling question of law” to the First Circuit.
On appeal, the First Circuit limited its review to the question certified by the district court: “Does the whistleblower protection afforded by Section 806(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, apply to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor of a public company, when that employee reports activity which he or she reasonably believes may constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348.” Upon reviewing the language and legislative history of the statute, the First Circuit concluded that the whistleblower protections of Section 806(a) do not extend to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor and, accordingly, reversed the holding of the district court.
In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit scrutinized the language and legislative history of the statute to determine the true intent of Congress. Initially, the First Circuit looked to the plain language of the statute. Given the language of the statute, the Court held that the “more natural reading” of the statute is that “only employees of the defined public companies are covered by this whistleblower provision . . . [because] the clause officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor or agent of such company goes to who is prohibited from retaliating or discriminating, not who is a covered employee . . . .”
Next, the First Circuit held that the title and caption of Section 806 also supported its finding. The caption of Section 806 is titled “Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies who Provide Evidence of Fraud” while the caption of Section 806(a) is titled “Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded companies.” Based upon the plain language of these captions, the First Circuit held that only employees of publicly traded companies are protected by the whistleblower provision in the statute. Similarly, the First Circuit also noted that Congress enacted other whistleblower protections in SOX which are broader than the provisions included in Section 806(a), thereby evidencing an intent to keep the scope of the statute narrow. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1513, which concerns retaliation against informants, “requires neither a public company, nor an employment relationship, nor a securities law violation to trigger coverage . . . [whereas] [t]he scope of § 1514A is, by contrast, conspicuously narrow.”
Finally, the First Circuit held that the legislative history of Section 806(a) confirms that it does not apply to employees of private companies. Specifically, the First Circuit noted that the statute was amended in 2010 to explicitly extend whistleblower coverage to employees of public companies’ subsidiaries and nothing in the reports of the Senate committee indicates that Congress intended to extend the protections of the statute to employees of contractors and subcontractors of publicly traded companies.
In light of the First Circuit’s ruling, the definition of the term “covered employee” has been clarified and the group of persons potentially covered by the protections of Section 806(a) have been significantly narrowed to include only employees of publicly traded companies — not employees of contractors and subcontractors who provide services to the publicly traded companies.
For further information, please contact John Stigi at (310) 228-3717 or Sean Kirby at (212) 634-3023.
A Reason to Revisit Maine's Indian Claims Settlement Acts: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Thursday, June 21, 2012
Gone Clio with Attorney Chad E. Burton
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/gone-clio/2011/11/gone-clio-with-attorney-chad-e-burton/
House Panel's Contempt Vote Against Holder Part Of Political Firefight
Wednesday, June 20, 2012
Legal Talk Network Live at LegalTechNY 2012-Onit’s Eric Elman Spotlights Onit Apps
What's New in the Structured Settlement Industry for 2012
Tuesday, June 19, 2012
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham - update
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/02/christopher_v_s.html
The Government We Deserve
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/suffolk-law/2012/06/the-government-we-deserve/
Monday, June 18, 2012
Why Dewey Died: Three Perspectives
Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202559736339&rss=nlj
DOMA down, but why?
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/05/doma_down_but_w.html
Sunday, June 17, 2012
America's First Great Depression: Economic Crisis and Political Disorder after the Panic of 1837
Tampering with documents in connection with a merger investigation can land you in jail!
By Robert Magielnicki and Malika Levarlet
One does not usually associate the possibility of criminal penalties with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act premerger review process. However, on May 3, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") announced that an executive of a South Korean company agreed to plead guilty to obstruction of justice charges and to serve five months in prison for altering documents filed with the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in connection with a proposed merger.
This plea agreement is the latest development in a civil merger investigation initiated by the Antitrust Division of the DOJ of the proposed acquisition by automated teller machine maker Nautilus Hyosung Holdings Inc. ("NHI") of a competing manufacturer of ATM systems, Triton Systems of Delaware Inc., in 2008. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 ("HSR"), as amended, requires companies contemplating mergers and acquisitions valued above certain thresholds to make premerger filings with the DOJ and the FTC. The federal antitrust agencies have authority to investigate and challenge the proposed transactions under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, if the transactions may substantially lessen competition. Before the Antitrust Division reached a decision regarding whether to challenge the transaction, the parties abandoned it.
In the two-count felony charge, the DOJ stated that Kyoungwon Pyo, in his role as senior vice president for corporate strategy of Hyosung Corporation, an affiliate of NHI, altered and directed subordinates to alter numerous corporate documents before they were submitted to the DOJ and the FTC in conjunction with the premerger HSR filings. The DOJ further alleged that, after the Antitrust Division opened a civil investigation of the proposed acquisition, Pyo falsified additional documents in response to a document request with the intention of impairing their integrity and availability for use in an official proceeding. According to the DOJ "the alterations misrepresented and minimized the competitive impact of the proposed acquisition."
On October 20, 2011, after voluntarily disclosing that numerous documents had been altered before being submitted to the government and agreeing to cooperate in the ongoing investigation, NHI pleaded guilty to two counts of obstruction of justice and paid a $200,000 criminal fine for its role in the document tampering. Following his employer, Pyo has agreed to plead guilty and to serve five months in prison for his conduct in a plea agreement which is subject to court approval. Pyo is charged with obstruction of justice, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a criminal fine of $250,000 for individuals.
This case marks the first time obstruction of justice charges have followed a civil merger investigation. The DOJ release is available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/282873.htm
For more information on the applicable HSR thresholds please consult: http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2012/01/articles/article/higher-filing-thresholds-for-hsr-act-premerger-notifications-and-interlocking-directorates-announced/
or contact: Bob Magielnicki at rmagielnicki@sheppardmullin.com; Jennifer Driscoll- Chippendale at jdriscoll-chippendale@sheppardmullin.com or Malika Levarlet at mlevarlet@sheppardmullin.com
Saturday, June 16, 2012
The Best Resources for Staying Current in E-Discovery
SU Discoverlaw.org PLUS
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/suffolk-law/2012/03/suplus/
Friday, June 15, 2012
Judge Kurt Kumli
Sorry Your Stepdad Is Such A Tool.
When he was a kid, in addition to being a tool, this California elected official must have really sucked at baseball. Sadly, below you can see him taking it out on his stepson.
You can read more about it here.
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/pDyLMV6q85c/post_430.html
Thursday, June 14, 2012
Imposter attorney catches a break on his sentence
See related ruling (pdf).
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
Rage Against The Machine
Be honest. You've smacked or kicked a machine - a parking meter, a vending machine, a copier ... But this guy took it to another level. Per The Salt Lake Tribune:
A Salt Lake City mortgage company employee allegedly got drunk, opened fired on his firm’s computer server with a .45-caliber automatic, and then told police someone had stolen his gun and caused the damage.Maybe he didn't do it?
Salt Lake County prosecutors say Campbell called police late on Aug. 12, claiming a man had stolen his gun and fired into the $100,000 computer server owned by RANLife Home Loans, located at 268 W. 400 South.
A probable cause statement alleges that Campbell told police he had been “mugged, assaulted with his own firearm and drugged” by a mystery assailant.So don't be so quick to judge. Wait, something is coming in over the wire ...
... acquaintances of Campbell reportedly told police he had earlier been drunk, was armed and had threatened to shoot the computer and maybe himself.Doh! Of note: "acquaintances" not "friends." The charges?
... criminal mischief, a second-degree felony; carrying a dangerous weapon while under the influence and providing false information to police, both Class B misdemeanors; and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor.No word on whether the server will make it ...
Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/8SW6-ath-kM/post_429.html
HRW urges Myanmar to protect communities from sectarian violence
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
Pacenti's rant: Law firm layoffs
Ultrabook Benefits for Attorneys
Monday, June 11, 2012
Massachusetts court rejects challenge to 'under God' in pledge
Sunday, June 10, 2012
Building your Client Portfolio
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/new-solo/2011/09/building-your-client-portfolio/
Saturday, June 9, 2012
Turn Your Solo Practice into a Highly Utilized Business
A Chat with American Bar Association President: Bill Robinson
Friday, June 8, 2012
IRS Issues New Guidance to Private Foundations on Program Related Investments
The IRS recently issued proposed regulations that provide new examples that illustrate what types of investments qualify as "program-related investments" (PRIs). These new examples are based on published guidance and on financial structures that had previously been approved in private letter rulings.
Program Related Investments—In General
Excise taxes are imposed on private foundations, as well as their managers, for making investments that jeopardize the carrying out of the private foundation's exempt purposes. Generally, such "jeopardizing investments" occur when foundation managers fail to exercise ordinary business care and prudence in providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the private foundation.
PRIs are exempt from being treated as jeopardizing investments. In general, PRIs are defined as investments that (1) have the primary purpose to accomplish one or more "charitable" purposes, (2) do not have the significant purpose of producing income or appreciating property, and (3) do not support legislation or political campaigns.
Using PRIs can be a great way for a private foundation to stimulate and advance charitable objectives. High-profile private foundations using PRIs include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
The Proposed Regulations
The proposed regulations do not modify the existing regulations—instead, they provide new examples of investments that qualify as PRIs by illustrating certain principles and current investment practices. While the examples in the existing regulations focus on domestic situations principally involving economically disadvantaged individuals in deteriorated urban areas, the new examples illustrate a broader range of situations more likely to be encountered in practice:
- PRIs can be achieved through a variety of investments, such as loans to individuals, tax-exempt organizations, and for-profit organizations, as well as equity investments in for-profit organizations.
- A private foundation's acceptance of an equity position in conjunction with making a loan does not necessarily prevent such investment from qualifying as a PRI.
- A credit enhancement arrangement (such as a deposit agreement or a guarantee agreement) may qualify as a PRI.
- A potentially high rate of return does not automatically prevent an investment from qualifying as a PRI.
- The charitable purposes that a PRI may serve are broad, and include advancing science, combating environmental deterioration, and promoting the arts.
- Activities conducted in foreign countries are considered to further a charitable purpose so long as the same activities would further a charitable purpose in the U.S.
- The recipients of PRIs do not need to be within a charitable class if they are the instruments for furthering a charitable purpose. For example, an investment in a for-profit that develops new drugs may qualify as a PRI if the for-profit business agrees to use the investment to develop a vaccine that will be distributed to poor individuals at an affordable cost.
Private foundations are permitted to rely on the new examples, even though the proposed regulations will not be effective until the Treasury publishes them as final regulations.
Benefits of Program Related Investments
PRIs receive special tax treatment, such as:
- PRIs are excluded from the assets that a private foundation takes into account when determining its "distributable amount" for the taxable year.
- PRIs are excluded from being treated as "business holdings" subject to excise tax.
- PRIs are generally treated as "qualifying distributions" for purposes of private foundation distribution requirements.
- PRIs do not constitute "taxable expenditures" provided that "expenditure responsibility" is exercised by the private foundation when required.
The new examples will be helpful to private foundations in determining if their investments may qualify as a PRI and receive such beneficial tax treatment.
Contact
For further information, please contact David Ulich at (310) 228-2274 or Danica Dodds at (310) 228-2274.
Disclaimer
This update has been prepared by Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute advertising, a solicitation, or legal advice, is not promised or guaranteed to be correct or complete and may or may not reflect the most current legal developments. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP expressly disclaims all liability in respect to actions taken or not taken based on the contents of this update.
America Invents Act: Micro Entity Status for Institutions of Higher Education
Thursday, June 7, 2012
Inside the Gerry Spence Trial Lawyers College
A Chat with American Bar Association President: Bill Robinson
Wednesday, June 6, 2012
Preservation Problems, Federal Rulemaking Efforts & E-Discovery in Criminal Actions
FDA Faulted for Failure to Review Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feed
Tuesday, June 5, 2012
Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Securities Class Action Against CBS Due to Plaintiffs' Failure to Plead Scienter and Reliance
In City of Omaha v. CBS Corp., No. 11-2575, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9535 (2d Cir. May 10, 2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Fait v. Regions Financial Corp., 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011) [see our prior blog article here], which held that statements regarding goodwill and loan loss reserves were “opinions” that could only be actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Securities & Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder, if defendants did not genuinely believe the statements to be true at the time they were made. Separately, the Court also held that plaintiffs’ complaint did not sufficiently allege reliance upon a fraudulently inflated price where the alleged “red flags” purportedly indicating the need for earlier review of CBS’ goodwill were matters of public knowledge and thus were already incorporated into the price of the stock. This decision is notable for its recognition that the presumption that publicly available information, if material, necessarily affects the price of an efficiently traded stock, which typically is used by plaintiffs to support securities fraud complaints, can also be used by defendants to defeat securities fraud complaints.
In City of Omaha, plaintiffs alleged that CBS Corp. (“CBS”) and various members of CBS’ management made statements about CBS’s goodwill and its general financial condition that were knowingly or recklessly false. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that, prior to an announcement by CBS in October 2008 that it was to perform an interim impairment test on its existing goodwill (and that, as a result, it expected to incur a non-cash impairment charge of approximately $14 billion), defendants knew about facts that indicated such a test was necessary at an earlier date. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the amended complaint, holding that plaintiffs “failed to cite a point, factually or temporally, when the defendants’ actions added up to something more than an exercise of real-time accounting judgment.” City of Omaha v. CBS Corp., No. 08 Civ. 10816, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57647, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2011).
The Second Circuit affirmed. The Court relied upon its earlier decision in Fait, in which the Second Circuit held that estimates of goodwill and loan loss reserves are inherently subjective and thus constitute “opinions,” such that statements in this context could only be false or misleading if defendants did not genuinely believe them to be true at the time they were made. The Court concluded that because plaintiffs’ amended complaint was “devoid even of conclusory allegations that defendants did not believe in their statements of opinion regarding CBS’s goodwill at the time they were made,” plaintiffs’ fraud claims were properly dismissed.
The Court then turned to the element of reliance. It is well settled that to state a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must plead reliance upon defendants’ allegedly false or misleading statements. Under Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), plaintiffs’ reliance is presumed if, inter alia, the defendant issuer’s stock is traded in an efficient market because it is assumed that a stock price incorporates all publicly available material information. The presumption of reliance is rebuttable, however, upon any showing that the causal link between the alleged misrepresentation and the price is broken.
Here, the Second Circuit held that such causal link was severed where indications of CBS’s financial well-being were matters of public knowledge. The Court observed that plaintiffs claimed to have relied upon several indicia as to why CBS should have been aware that impairment testing of its intangible assets was required in early 2008: the widening gap between CBS’s book value and the company’s market capitalization, the declines in advertising revenues, and the expectations of analysts regarding the media business. The Court noted that these so-called “red flags,” as well as CBS’ last impairment test in 2007 prior to the appearance of these red flags, were all matters of public knowledge. Thus, “CBS’s market price would at all pertinent times have reflected the need for, if any, or the culpable failure to undertake, if any, interim impairment testing.” The Court reasoned that because market makers were aware of the alleged “red flags,” the market price would have accounted for such and would not have been affected by the alleged misrepresentations. Under such circumstances, there is no basis for finding that a fraud had been transmitted through the market price. Thus, the Court held the complaint failed to allege that CBS stock was fraudulently inflated and, consequently, failed to allege reliance upon such fraud.
Commentators have long recognized that issues of causation, reliance, materiality and price impact in securities fraud actions are interrelated. This decision moves the law closer to applying a more consistent approach to the issues. The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) [see blog article here], and Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) [see blog article here], previewed several of these issues, but a more comprehensive analysis still awaits Supreme Court consideration.
For further information, please contact John Stigi at (310) 228-3717 or Valentina Shenderovich at (212) 634-3019.
Legal Assistance for our Troops, Veterans & Military Families
Monday, June 4, 2012
"Biggest Bunch of Crap Ever"
Via Fox 8 News:
Nine female healthcare contractors providing healthcare services to inmates at the Portsmouth City Jail claimed that when they arrived at work they were sent with a female guard to a private room.
“They were told to completely remove their clothing, they were forced to bend over and cough while jail officials looked in their bodily cavities,” said ACLU lawyer Rebecca Glenberg.
These were contracted nurses, not misdemeanant or people arrested for unpaid parking tickets that were actually paid. You know, the sort of people who deserve a good body cavity search. Sheriff Watson, whose nickname around Portsmouth is Mr. Sensitivity, was unimpressed. When he learned he was being sued for the searches, he responded:
“I thought it was the biggest bunch of crap I’d ever heard in my life,” said Watson.
The Sheriff contends he has every right to strip search anyone coming in to his jail. He emphasized that includes his owns deputy. He says security is his primary concern and he had been having problems with contraband getting in to the jail.
Anyone? Lawyers meeting with their clients, for example? Though a defendant may have a constitutional right to counsel, the Constitution says nothing about the right of a lawyer to meet with his client with his clothes on, or not to undergo a myopic inspection as part of the entrance protocol. And if Sheriff Watson was really intend on being thorough, there is always the colonoscopy, just in case. You never know what a lawyer could be hiding in there.
“The nurses need to understand they don’t run the jail, we run the jail and they have the option to be searched or leave,” said Watson.
Watson believes the searches are part of his efforts to ensure inmate safety.
“The world’s gotten so politically correct you can’t do your job,” he said.
One might muse that the good Sheriff could be asked the same question if he happens to appear in an emergency room in extremis, and a nurse orders him to squat and spread before showing him any concern. While he may own the guns in the jail, the nurses have the juice in the ER. I wonder whether Sheriff Watson understands that it works both ways?
Certainly, one has to wonder why the nurses didn't turn on their heels and walk out of Sheriff Watson's domain. Perhaps they felt they had no option, since the screws had guns and gave them order. Maybe they were so dedicated to the health of prisoners they felt morally bound to endure the search lest the inmates' health suffer. It could even be as simple as they needed the money. Or maybe there were just foolish.
At a time when employer's demanding Facebook passwords causes outrage, it seems almost quaint in comparison to a body cavity search. This hardly seems to fall under the facile rubric of political correctness. The notion that Sheriff's keep their eyes (and all other body parts) out of nurses' orifices without a damn good reason.
The alternative for healthcare professionals who are needed to tend to the care of prisoners is to tell nice old sheriff's like Watson to enjoy his own body cavity search, and refuse to suffer the indignity. But then, that doesn't do much to help the prisoner in need of medical attention. Should they refuse to enter as long as Watson continues to have his head firmly implanted in the search zone and allow inmates to suffer, perhaps die, for lack of medical care?
The most absurd part of Watson's thinking, and I use that word in its broadest sense, is that there is an easy alternative means to protect against the introduction of contraband. After a prisoner is seen by a nurse, and before they re-enter general population, search the prisoner. It's not that I'm advocating this be done, or that prisoners should be needlessly search and forced to undergo the indignity of a body cavity search in order to obtain health care, but to note the stupidity of Watson's position.
Relative to the nurse, the prisoner is more rationally subject to search. That's comparative, of course, rather than absolute. There is just no sound reason to engage in any of this, absent a specific reason to believe that an individual has secreted contraband on his person. As far as Watson's contraband problems are concerned, there is an even better solution available to him since the primary source of unlawful stuff coming into a jail isn nurses' tushies.
The Sheriff contends he has every right to strip search anyone coming in to his jail. He emphasized that includes his owns deputy.
Now he's on to something. Maybe Sheriff Watson will let us know how that turns out. And when it's his turn to squat and cough, I'm sure there will be no shortage of volunteers to do the job.
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Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2012/05/27/biggest-bunch-of-crap-ever.aspx?ref=rss
The Surefire Way to End Online Piracy: End Copyright
Sunday, June 3, 2012
Bridging the Gap in Copyright Protection of Symbols, Shapes and Letters
Gone Clio with Attorney Beate Weiss-Krull
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/gone-clio/2012/01/gone-clio-with-beate-weiss-krull/
Saturday, June 2, 2012
First Circuit Holds That Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Extends Only to Employees of Public Companies, Not Employees of Private Companies Who Are Contractors or Subcontractors for Covered Public Companies
In Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 10-2240, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2085 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a case of first impression, held that the whistleblower provision in Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (“SOX”), applies only to employees of public companies, and does not protect employees of private companies who are contractors or subcontractors for the covered public company. This decision, the first decision by a United States Court of Appeals on this issue, helps clarify the definition of “covered employee” under whistleblower provisions of SOX.
Plaintiffs Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang each brought separate actions in which they alleged unlawful retaliation by their employers in violation of the whistleblower protections of Section 806 of SOX. Section 806(a) of SOX provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee . . . . ”
The employers of Lawson and Zang were each private companies that provided advising or management services by contract to the Fidelity family of mutual funds. Lawson’s and Zang’s employers each moved to dismiss the claims arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs were not “covered employees” within the meaning of Section 806. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motions, ruling that the SOX whistleblower protection of Section 806 extended to employees of private agents, contractors and subcontractors to public companies. Defendants moved for an interlocutory appeal and the district court certified a “controlling question of law” to the First Circuit.
On appeal, the First Circuit limited its review to the question certified by the district court: “Does the whistleblower protection afforded by Section 806(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, apply to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor of a public company, when that employee reports activity which he or she reasonably believes may constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348.” Upon reviewing the language and legislative history of the statute, the First Circuit concluded that the whistleblower protections of Section 806(a) do not extend to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor and, accordingly, reversed the holding of the district court.
In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit scrutinized the language and legislative history of the statute to determine the true intent of Congress. Initially, the First Circuit looked to the plain language of the statute. Given the language of the statute, the Court held that the “more natural reading” of the statute is that “only employees of the defined public companies are covered by this whistleblower provision . . . [because] the clause officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor or agent of such company goes to who is prohibited from retaliating or discriminating, not who is a covered employee . . . .”
Next, the First Circuit held that the title and caption of Section 806 also supported its finding. The caption of Section 806 is titled “Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies who Provide Evidence of Fraud” while the caption of Section 806(a) is titled “Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded companies.” Based upon the plain language of these captions, the First Circuit held that only employees of publicly traded companies are protected by the whistleblower provision in the statute. Similarly, the First Circuit also noted that Congress enacted other whistleblower protections in SOX which are broader than the provisions included in Section 806(a), thereby evidencing an intent to keep the scope of the statute narrow. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1513, which concerns retaliation against informants, “requires neither a public company, nor an employment relationship, nor a securities law violation to trigger coverage . . . [whereas] [t]he scope of § 1514A is, by contrast, conspicuously narrow.”
Finally, the First Circuit held that the legislative history of Section 806(a) confirms that it does not apply to employees of private companies. Specifically, the First Circuit noted that the statute was amended in 2010 to explicitly extend whistleblower coverage to employees of public companies’ subsidiaries and nothing in the reports of the Senate committee indicates that Congress intended to extend the protections of the statute to employees of contractors and subcontractors of publicly traded companies.
In light of the First Circuit’s ruling, the definition of the term “covered employee” has been clarified and the group of persons potentially covered by the protections of Section 806(a) have been significantly narrowed to include only employees of publicly traded companies — not employees of contractors and subcontractors who provide services to the publicly traded companies.
For further information, please contact John Stigi at (310) 228-3717 or Sean Kirby at (212) 634-3023.
School liability for supervisors' negligent supervision of molesting counselor
Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/03/school_liabilit.html
Friday, June 1, 2012
Shareholder Activism
Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/boston-university-school-of-law/2012/04/shareholder-activism/
Value Billing
Ed discusses how to increase your value by understanding what is most important to your clients.
Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/53gKE3Bh0gg/