Thursday, July 31, 2014

Dry Times: How to Deal with the Impact of California’s Drought on Critical Commercial Agreements

On January 17, 2014, California Governor Jerry Brown declared a “State of Emergency” in California due to the severity of drought conditions across the State.  Since then, the California drought continues to be severe and unprecedented in recent years, and is taking a pervasive toll on California residents, businesses, farm land, foliage and wildlife.  Despite recent rainfall, local water districts and the State have called for voluntary, and in some locales, mandatory reduction in consumption of water.  After considering the severe human toll, anyone doing business with an entity located in California (or other western states experiencing similar drought conditions) that requires water for any business purpose, particularly farmers in Northern and Central California where there are fewer alternative sources of water, must be concerned about inventory and the impact of the drought on its supply chain.  Can my California contract counterparty fulfill its obligations to produce sufficient quantities of produce, dairy products, steel, flowers, honey, etc., to meet my contract needs?  Waiting for a delivery that never arrives, is delayed or arrives in lower quantity or, worse yet, quality, is not a viable option.  The key is to be prepared to find an alternative supplier so that production goals can be timely met.  Successful navigation of these issues requires careful contract drafting and contemplation in advance of new agreements, and critical analysis of existing contracts.  This article highlights the pertinent legal mechanisms at work and options for your business.

Section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) follows the longstanding common law derived principle of allowing the concerned recipient of supplies to demand adequate assurance of its supplier’s ability to perform.  The law adopted in most states provides that “when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.”  For purposes of Section 2-609, “reasonableness” will be “determined according to commercial standards” between merchants.  A failure by the recipient of a justified demand for adequate assurance to provide such assurances within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days, will be treated as a repudiation of the contract.

The key for those seeking assurances of performance is to describe with as much specificity as possible the reasonable grounds for “insecurity.”  In the case of the drought, one does not have to look far to find news articles describing the historic drought in significant detail and showing the hardest hit regions.  The form of the demand need not be a formal lawyers’ letter, but can be a friendly request to a good, long term vendor asking for assurances that product of the quality and quantity the recipient has come to expect will continue to be delivered within the time expected.  Setting a reasonable time frame for a response to the demand is also important and will depend upon the imminence of the need for or expected receipt of goods.

The form and clarity of the response will be key and is often heavily litigated.  Anything short of a prompt promise by a supplier to meet delivery and production obligations is a red flag and may be grounds for termination of an existing contract to purchase goods from that supplier; however, an unjustified early termination of contract rights is a breach, so a party considering terminating a supplier under an agreed contract should consider the risks of termination, particularly where the supplier is attempting to retain the right to supply.  Further, before demanding adequate assurance, the recipient may wish to investigate an alternative supply chain in case the response is insufficient and goods need to be reordered from another source.

Significantly, a supplier in dire financial straits that ends up in bankruptcy may still be the recipient of a demand for adequate assurance of its ability to perform.  Indeed, asking a debtor in bankruptcy for adequate assurance of its ability to perform its contractual obligations is a prudent business approach, though the ability of the non-debtor contract party to terminate is limited (proceeding by motion before the bankruptcy court to terminate is often the appropriate option if adequate assurance is not received or if a debtor confirms that it cannot perform).

Where a contract calls not just for supplies but for services, contract parties should look beyond the UCC to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Restatement”).  Section 251 of the Restatement provides in part that “where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a breach by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach,” then the “obligee may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he receives such assurance.”  In the Restatement, as in the UCC, failure to provide such assurance within a reasonable time is treated as a repudiation of the contract.

From the other perspective, a supplier who fears that it will be unable to meet the terms of its contract to supply goods in sufficient quantity, quality, or price, particularly where the costs of producing have markedly increased due to the impact of the drought, may attempt to invoke a claim of force majeure.  Many contracts have a force majeure provision that excuses performance (or non-performance) upon the occurrence of events such as (i) acts of God (e.g., severe droughts and storms) and (ii) man-made events (e.g., wars or certain acts of governments).  Employee strikes may also be viewed as a basis for a finding of force majeure in some contracts.

For the purposes of California law, the California Supreme Court gave the definitive definition of a force majeure in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228 (1946).  The Court explained that “‘Force majeure,’ or the Latin expression ‘vis major,’ is not necessarily limited to the equivalent of an act of God.  The test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party’s intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care.”  Id. at 238.

Additionally, acts of God can be involved in related “impossibility” scenarios.  For example, in Squillante v. California Lands, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 2d 89 (1935), the California Court of Appeal excused a grower from having to deliver a full quantity of grapes under an excuse of impossibility due to drought conditions.  There, the contract stipulated a certain quality and variety of grape.  The drought made it impossible for that grower to grow grapes of the sufficient quality and variety, and therefore the court held that the grower could not be compelled to perform impossibilities and that it could not be held liable in damages for its failure to comply with the contract because the failure resulted from no fault of its own.  (The court also stressed the importance of the “grower” not being a “dealer” of grapes, in that they suggest that a dealer may not have been so excused.)  While this case dates from 1935, it is apparently still good law.

The scenarios above do not address the situation where a supplier is not necessarily prevented from supplying, but the cost of supplying increases so significantly higher than anticipated, that performance under the contract becomes commercially “impracticable.”  While related to the concepts of force majeure and impossibility, impracticability is a distinct problem.  Section 2-615 of the UCC provides that, absent a supplier assuming a greater obligation, “delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.”

A successful defense of impracticability also requires that seller “notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery,” and, in the case of reduced or limited capacity to perform, that the seller then allocate production and deliveries among his customers in a “fair and reasonable” manner.

In the Official Comments to UCC Section 2-615, the American Law Institute explained that generally, “increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.  But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section” (emphasis added).

Whether a defense of impracticability rests on the increased cost resulting from shortages of water or other inputs affected by the drought, or from a governmental regulation or order limiting access to water, impracticability clearly represents an intractable problem absent clear contract drafting and advice.  Contract drafters have several tools at their disposal to more clearly delineate the parties’ risk allocation.  For example, properly constructed force majeure clauses should address the risk of supervening events expressly in the agreement.  Additionally, “hell or high water” provisions make it clear the parties’ intend to implacably bind themselves despite any contingencies.

When problems raising impossibility, force majeure, or impracticability issues arise, the key will be managing expectations.  If buyers suspect there are delays or other issues on the horizon, they should not hesitate to seek adequate assurances of performance from their suppliers. Likewise, if there are substantial additional costs or problems in maintaining the quality or quantity or the timing of supply, suppliers should notify their buyers as soon as practicable to adequately manage the relationship in the near term and maintain the relationship as the drought subsides and production gets back on track.

Think ahead when drafting important supply contracts.  Read your contracts closely when a problem arises and reach out to counterparties early to address potential problems before they arise or worsen.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/04/dry-times-how-to-deal-with-the-impact-of-californias-drought-on-critical-commercial-agreements/

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Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Securities Fraud Complaint Where Inference of Scienter Was Not Sufficiently Strong

In Yates v. Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC, No. 12-2496 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), against defendant Municipal Mortgage & Equity (“MuniMae”) and its individual officer and director defendants.  The Court held that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of defendants’ scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, et seq.  The Court declined to accept that the inference of scienter offered by plaintiffs — supported by statements from confidential witnesses, presence of red flags, allegations of insider trading and general business incentives — was at least as compelling as the opposing inference of mere negligence that could be drawn from the amended complaint.  Yates is one of the few reported decisions from the Fourth Circuit applying the PSRLA, and it solidly reaffirms the PSLRA’s requirement that a plaintiff plead more than just allegations based upon conjecture and happenstance to satisfy heightened pleading requirements.

During the putative class period (May 3, 2004 to January 29, 2008) MuniMae was involved in organizing investment partnerships to pool low-income housing tax credits (“LIHTCs”) and sell them to investors.  Prior to 2003, MuniMae treated its LIHTC investment partnerships as off balance sheet entities.  In 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board adopted Interpretation No. 46R (“FASB 46R”), requiring that a company that is the primary beneficiary of “Variable Interest Entities” consolidate the entities assets and liabilities onto its financial statements.  MuniMae began asserting compliance with FASB 46R in the first quarter of 2004.  However, at that time MuniMae internally concluded that FASB 46R did not require it to consolidate for financial statement purposes all of tis LIHTC investment partnerships.  MuniMae continued to assert compliance with FASB 46R through 2006.  In September 2006, MuniMae announced it would be restating certain financial statements and through a series of later disclosures finally announced that the restatement would deal with FASB 46R accounting errors.  As a result of the piecemeal disclosures, MuniMae’s share price dropped precipitously.  The following day, MuniMae disclosed the full extent of the restatement’s scope and MuniMae’s stock experienced an additional decline.  Eventually, in April 2008, MuniMae disclosed that it had spent over $54 million on the restatement.

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that defendants made false representations that MuniMae was complying with FASB 46R and concealed the expected cost of the restatement in violation of Section 10(b).  The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that the amended complaint did not sufficiently allege a claim under Section 10(b) because it did not meet the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard for scienter allegations.  Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.  First, the Fourth Circuit held that the confidential witness testimony supplied by plaintiffs did not support a “strong inference of wrongful intent.”  The testimony did suggest that defendants knew earlier than disclosed that MuniMae was not in compliance with 46R and that the required restatement would be a difficult and costly undertaking.  It also indicated that the issue was difficult and complex and had thrown MuniMae into “confusion and chaos” — which the Court held supported the opposing inference that the defendants were merely negligent.  In fact, the Court explained, defendants’ subsequent disclosures negated an inference of fraudulent intent because, although the disclosures were not “as timely or as fulsome” as plaintiffs would have liked, they gave rise to a compelling inference that the MuniMae defendants were attempting to keep the investing public informed.

Second, the Court held that while there were several “red flags” concerning MuniMae’s core operations — the need in and of itself for several restatements, frequent accounting meetings, the firing of outside auditors, and rapid CFO overturn — they did not in and of themselves give rise to a strong inference of scienter.  Not only was the FASB 46R accounting error not especially obvious, but the other warning signs easily lent themselves to benign interpretations as a result of MiniMae’s obvious attempts to get a handle on its creeping accounting problems.

Third, the Court of Appeals followed the decisions of several other Circuits in holding insufficient plaintiffs’ allegation that the individual defendants “must have acted intentionally or recklessly” merely because they were senior executives and the LIHTC investment partnerships represented a core business of MuniMae.

Fourth, in addressing plaintiffs’ allegations concerning insider trading, the Court held that while the overall value of MuniMae shares sold during the class period was higher than in previous years and thus consistent with an inference that the insiders who traded had a motive to commit fraud, the inference that the trades were innocent was stronger.  There were no allegations that the insiders timed their sales to take advantage of any particular disclosure.  Nor was the level of any insiders’ divestiture particularly alarming.  Moreover, the Court noted, the fact that several of the individual defendants traded under non-discretionary Rule 10b5-1 plans further weakened any inference of fraudulent purpose.

Finally, the Court held that plaintiffs other allegations of motive were similarly lacking as the alleged motivations amounted to nothing more than “financial motivations common to every company.”

Thus, in Yates, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the heightened standard of pleading a plaintiff must meet to satisfy the PSLRA.  Specifically, the Court emphasized that the allegations of scienter under Section 10(b) cannot be read in a vaccum.  They must be holistically analyzed in comparison with the disclosures actually made by defendants.  General business motivations, insider trading and the core nature of the problems alleged by plaintiffs cannot turn a company’s repeated attempts to inform investors of the ongoing and ever-evolving nature of a problem into intentional rather than merely negligent conduct.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/04/fourth-circuit-affirms-dismissal-of-securities-fraud-complaint-where-inference-of-scienter-was-not-sufficiently-strong/

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The Federal Laws that Affect Workers Compensation Claims

When a workers' compensation claim is made, there are many elements of federal law that get triggered. Among those elements are the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Family and Medical Leave Act, and Americans with Disabilities Act. As an employer, navigating these intersecting laws can be a challenging task while running a business. On this episode of Workers Comp Matters, host Alan Pierce interviews Melissa Fleischer from the HR Learning Center LLC. Together they discuss multiple federal components affecting workers' compensation claim rights and duties. In addition they talk about when workers can be terminated, healthcare commitments under COBRA, and unpaid leave. Tune in to learn more about different paperwork requirements under the different federal laws plus much much more.
Melissa Fleischer, Esq. is the President and Founder of HR Learning Center LLC with 20 years of law practice experience specializing in employment discrimination litigation. Her HR consulting firm specializes in providing workplace solutions and training to employers on a wide range of legal and human resource management issues. She was previously associated with Epstein Becker and Green in NYC and served as a chapter editor for the Family and Medical Leave Act Treatise, published by the Bureau of National Affairs. Ms. Fleischer is also an adjunct faculty member with the Professional Development Center at SUNY/Westchester Community College in Valhalla, New York and a member of the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM).
Special thanks to our sponsor, PInow.

Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2014/06/federal-laws-affect-workers-compensation-claims

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Mark Woods: Time to get it done when it comes to riverwalk (Florida Times-Union)

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Source: http://news.feedzilla.com/en_us/stories/law/video/389355019?client_source=feed&format=rss

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Attorney L. Lin Wood on Representing the Ramseys and Other High-Profile Individuals

John and Patsy Ramsey, Richard Jewell, and Gary Condit are names everyone has heard as they were all on trial in the court of public opinion. These cases were spread throughout the media and, even though there was never an arrest made in any, the public had judged the accused. L. Lin Wood was the lawyer representing these individuals as they fought for their reputations. An expert in First Amendment litigation and management of the media in high-profile cases, Wood has been referred to as "the attorney for the damned."
On this episode of The Paralegal Voice, Vicki Voisin has the opportunity to interview L. Lin Wood about the benefits and difficulties in representing high-profile individuals and how a paralegal can be most effective in these cases. Wood began his career in defamation cases when he represented Richard Jewell in the Centennial Olympic Park bombing case and has since represented the Ramseys, Gary Condit, attorney Howard Stern, and many others in whom the media took a particular interest. He describes how fighting against the media can be different than a regular plaintiff and how he protects his clients from public accusations. He explains that there are additional issues when dealing with a public figure including when to sue for slander and how to control what his clients say to the media. In terms of paralegals working in libel cases, there are three qualities Wood expects: acute knowledge about the case, understanding of the situation, and ability to keep track of a wealth of information coming from the media.
L. Lin Wood is an Atlanta attorney who has developed a national reputation during his more than 36 years as a trial lawyer focusing on civil litigation, representing individuals and corporations as plaintiffs or defendants in tort and business cases involving claims of significant damage. He can be found at www.whetriallaw.com.
Special thanks to our sponsors. NALA is a professional association for paralegals providing continuing education and professional certification programs for paralegals at nala.org. Also, visit ServeNow.com for a nationwide network of trusted, prescreened process servers.

Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/paralegal-voice/2014/06/attorney-l-lin-wood-representing-ramseys-high-profile-individuals

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Obesity can be a disability, at least in Montana

Obesity can be a disability, at least in Montana.

Full decision: BNSF Railway v. Feit (Montana 07/06/2012)

Feit got a ruling from the Montana Department of Labor that BNSF Railway discriminated against him by refusing to hire him because BNSF regarded him as being disabled due to his obesity.

BNSF then went to federal court to get a review of whether it violated the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA) by refusing to hire Feit because of his obesity.

The federal court then asked the Supreme Court of Montana to decide how to rule, asking this question: Is obesity that is not the symptom of a physiological condition a "physical or mental impairment" as it is used in Montana Code Annotated section 49-2-101(19)(a)?

The Montana Supreme Court answered with a qualified yes. The court answered: Obesity that is not the symptom of a physiological disorder or condition may constitute a "physical or mental impairment" within the meaning of Montana Code Annotated section 49-2-101(19)(a) if the individual's weight is outside the "normal range" and affects "one or more body systems" as defined in 29 CFR 1630.2(h)(1)(2011).

The federal court laid out these facts:

1. BNSF offered Eric Feit a conditional offer of employment as a conductor trainee. The employment was conditioned upon successful completion of a physical examination, drug screening, background investigation, proof of employment eligibility, and BNSF’s Medical History Questionnaire.

2. On February 6, 2008, BNSF informed Feit he was not qualified for his “safety sensitive” position because of the “significant health and safety risks associated with extreme obesity.”

3. BNSF told Feit he would not be considered for the job unless he either lost 10% of his body weight, or successfully completed additional physical examinations at his own expense. Regardless of the test results, BNSF did not guarantee Feit a job.

4. With the exception of a sleep study test, Feit successfully completed the additional physical exams BNSF requested. The sleep test cost at least $1,800, and Feit could not afford the test.

5. Because BNSF informed Feit that it would not consider him for the conductor trainee position unless he completed the sleep study, Feit set out to lose 10% of his weight.

6. A genuine dispute exists regarding whether BNSF received documentation of Feit’s weight loss.

The Montana Supreme Court noted that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance distinguished between conditions that were impairments and conditions that were simply physical characteristics, which suggested that a person with normal weight required a physical condition to qualify as an impairment. The court referred to the ADAAA which instructed courts that they were interpreting the statute too restrictively and expressed its specific intent that determination of disability not demand extensive analysis (122 Stat. at 3553-54).

The DISSENT noted that the definition of a "physical and mental impairment" included "any physiological disorder, or condition" that affects a major system of the human body (29 CFR 1630.2(h)(1)), and argued that the plain meaning required a physiological condition be present before an impairment existed.

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Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/07/obesity_can_be.html

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Is Your Out-of-State LLC “Doing Business” in California?

Individuals and entities, including those from outside California, who invest in or do business through an out-of-state limited liability company (“LLC”) may be surprised to find out that they have filing obligations and tax liabilities in California as a result of California’s far-reaching rules and interpretations related to when an LLC is treated as “doing business” in California.

The law:

Under California law, all LLCs are required to annually file a California tax return and pay at least an $800 California franchise tax if they:

  • Engage in any transaction in California for the purpose of financial gain or profit.
  • Are incorporated or organized in California.
  • Have qualified or registered to do business in California.
  • Are “doing business” in California, whether or not they incorporated, organized, qualified or registered under California law.

The Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”) takes the position that an LLC organized in a jurisdiction outside California is nevertheless “doing business” in California if:

  • It is a member of an LLC that does business in California.
  • It is a general partner in a partnership that does business in California.
  • Any of the LLC’s members, managers, or other agents conducts business in California on behalf of the LLC.

In addition, an out-of-state LLC is “doing business” in California if:

  • The LLC is commercially domiciled in California (i.e., California is the place where realistic control of the LLC’s functions is centered).
  • Sales, including sales by the LLC’s agents and independent contractors, in California exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 25% of the LLC’s total sales.
  • Real or tangible property of the LLC in California exceeds the lesser of $50,000 or 25% of the LLC’s total real and tangible property.
  • The amount paid in California by the LLC for compensation exceeds the lesser of $50,000 or 25% of the total compensation paid by the LLC.

For purposes of these calculations, the sales, property and payroll of the LLC include the LLC’s pro‑rata or distributive share of any pass‑through entities (i.e., partnerships, LLCs and S‑corporations).

Some examples that may surprise you:

  • A Nevada LLC acquires a passive minority membership interest in a Delaware LLC that owns and operates several California shopping centers.  The Nevada LLC may be treated as “doing business” in California simply by reason of its ownership of a membership interest in the Delaware operating LLC, resulting in the Nevada LLC’s own California tax filing obligations.
  • A Montana LLC owns an apartment building in Montana that is managed by an on-site (Montana) property manager.  One of the three LLC managing members is a California resident.  The Montana LLC may be treated as “doing business” in California simply by reason of the existence of a California managing member.

Penalties:

The State can impose a penalty of $2,000 per taxable year if an out-of-state LLC is doing business in California and fails to file a tax return and pay the taxes and fees due. The penalty is due only if the FTB sends a written demand that a return be filed and the LLC does not file the return within 60 days.

Also, any contract made by an out-of-state LLC in California that is neither qualified to do business nor has a corporate account number from the FTB is voidable by any other party to that contract for the period during which the out-of-state LLC fails to file a tax return required by the FTB.

Note that the FTB’s determination of when an out-of-state LLC must file tax returns is in contrast with the California Corporations Code.  Under the California Corporations Code, any entity that “actively engages in any transaction in California for the purpose of financial gain or profit” must register with the California Secretary of State.  But for this purpose, an out-of-state corporation is not considered to be transacting business in California merely because it is a member or a manager of a domestic or out-of-state LLC or a limited partner of a domestic or out-of-state limited partnership.  Moreover, the new California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, effective as of January 1, 2014, provides that an out-of-state LLC “may” register in California and does not impose penalties for failing to do so.

Non-residents of California are also not necessarily off the hook for California taxes arising from ownership of an LLC.  Such non-residents may owe taxes on pass-through income sourced from an LLC’s California activities despite their non-resident status.

BOTTOM LINE:  Your out-of-state LLC may have nexus and filing obligations in California and taxes may be owed for such LLC’s activities in California!

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/07/is-your-out-of-state-llc-doing-business-in-california/

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States Hit Snags Giving Licenses to Undocumented Immigrants

DENVER—A law granting driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants is set to take effect Friday in Colorado, but the state is facing some challenges as it seeks to handle a wave of people interested in applying for the documents.

Other states with large immigrant populations, such as California and Illinois, are also dealing with complications and high demands as they move to implement similar laws.

Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/30/states-face-challenges-with-laws-granting-licenses-to-undocumented-immigrants/?mod=smallbusiness

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Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Dry Times: How to Deal with the Impact of California’s Drought on Critical Commercial Agreements

On January 17, 2014, California Governor Jerry Brown declared a “State of Emergency” in California due to the severity of drought conditions across the State.  Since then, the California drought continues to be severe and unprecedented in recent years, and is taking a pervasive toll on California residents, businesses, farm land, foliage and wildlife.  Despite recent rainfall, local water districts and the State have called for voluntary, and in some locales, mandatory reduction in consumption of water.  After considering the severe human toll, anyone doing business with an entity located in California (or other western states experiencing similar drought conditions) that requires water for any business purpose, particularly farmers in Northern and Central California where there are fewer alternative sources of water, must be concerned about inventory and the impact of the drought on its supply chain.  Can my California contract counterparty fulfill its obligations to produce sufficient quantities of produce, dairy products, steel, flowers, honey, etc., to meet my contract needs?  Waiting for a delivery that never arrives, is delayed or arrives in lower quantity or, worse yet, quality, is not a viable option.  The key is to be prepared to find an alternative supplier so that production goals can be timely met.  Successful navigation of these issues requires careful contract drafting and contemplation in advance of new agreements, and critical analysis of existing contracts.  This article highlights the pertinent legal mechanisms at work and options for your business.

Section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) follows the longstanding common law derived principle of allowing the concerned recipient of supplies to demand adequate assurance of its supplier’s ability to perform.  The law adopted in most states provides that “when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.”  For purposes of Section 2-609, “reasonableness” will be “determined according to commercial standards” between merchants.  A failure by the recipient of a justified demand for adequate assurance to provide such assurances within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days, will be treated as a repudiation of the contract.

The key for those seeking assurances of performance is to describe with as much specificity as possible the reasonable grounds for “insecurity.”  In the case of the drought, one does not have to look far to find news articles describing the historic drought in significant detail and showing the hardest hit regions.  The form of the demand need not be a formal lawyers’ letter, but can be a friendly request to a good, long term vendor asking for assurances that product of the quality and quantity the recipient has come to expect will continue to be delivered within the time expected.  Setting a reasonable time frame for a response to the demand is also important and will depend upon the imminence of the need for or expected receipt of goods.

The form and clarity of the response will be key and is often heavily litigated.  Anything short of a prompt promise by a supplier to meet delivery and production obligations is a red flag and may be grounds for termination of an existing contract to purchase goods from that supplier; however, an unjustified early termination of contract rights is a breach, so a party considering terminating a supplier under an agreed contract should consider the risks of termination, particularly where the supplier is attempting to retain the right to supply.  Further, before demanding adequate assurance, the recipient may wish to investigate an alternative supply chain in case the response is insufficient and goods need to be reordered from another source.

Significantly, a supplier in dire financial straits that ends up in bankruptcy may still be the recipient of a demand for adequate assurance of its ability to perform.  Indeed, asking a debtor in bankruptcy for adequate assurance of its ability to perform its contractual obligations is a prudent business approach, though the ability of the non-debtor contract party to terminate is limited (proceeding by motion before the bankruptcy court to terminate is often the appropriate option if adequate assurance is not received or if a debtor confirms that it cannot perform).

Where a contract calls not just for supplies but for services, contract parties should look beyond the UCC to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Restatement”).  Section 251 of the Restatement provides in part that “where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a breach by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach,” then the “obligee may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he receives such assurance.”  In the Restatement, as in the UCC, failure to provide such assurance within a reasonable time is treated as a repudiation of the contract.

From the other perspective, a supplier who fears that it will be unable to meet the terms of its contract to supply goods in sufficient quantity, quality, or price, particularly where the costs of producing have markedly increased due to the impact of the drought, may attempt to invoke a claim of force majeure.  Many contracts have a force majeure provision that excuses performance (or non-performance) upon the occurrence of events such as (i) acts of God (e.g., severe droughts and storms) and (ii) man-made events (e.g., wars or certain acts of governments).  Employee strikes may also be viewed as a basis for a finding of force majeure in some contracts.

For the purposes of California law, the California Supreme Court gave the definitive definition of a force majeure in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228 (1946).  The Court explained that “‘Force majeure,’ or the Latin expression ‘vis major,’ is not necessarily limited to the equivalent of an act of God.  The test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party’s intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care.”  Id. at 238.

Additionally, acts of God can be involved in related “impossibility” scenarios.  For example, in Squillante v. California Lands, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 2d 89 (1935), the California Court of Appeal excused a grower from having to deliver a full quantity of grapes under an excuse of impossibility due to drought conditions.  There, the contract stipulated a certain quality and variety of grape.  The drought made it impossible for that grower to grow grapes of the sufficient quality and variety, and therefore the court held that the grower could not be compelled to perform impossibilities and that it could not be held liable in damages for its failure to comply with the contract because the failure resulted from no fault of its own.  (The court also stressed the importance of the “grower” not being a “dealer” of grapes, in that they suggest that a dealer may not have been so excused.)  While this case dates from 1935, it is apparently still good law.

The scenarios above do not address the situation where a supplier is not necessarily prevented from supplying, but the cost of supplying increases so significantly higher than anticipated, that performance under the contract becomes commercially “impracticable.”  While related to the concepts of force majeure and impossibility, impracticability is a distinct problem.  Section 2-615 of the UCC provides that, absent a supplier assuming a greater obligation, “delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.”

A successful defense of impracticability also requires that seller “notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery,” and, in the case of reduced or limited capacity to perform, that the seller then allocate production and deliveries among his customers in a “fair and reasonable” manner.

In the Official Comments to UCC Section 2-615, the American Law Institute explained that generally, “increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.  But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section” (emphasis added).

Whether a defense of impracticability rests on the increased cost resulting from shortages of water or other inputs affected by the drought, or from a governmental regulation or order limiting access to water, impracticability clearly represents an intractable problem absent clear contract drafting and advice.  Contract drafters have several tools at their disposal to more clearly delineate the parties’ risk allocation.  For example, properly constructed force majeure clauses should address the risk of supervening events expressly in the agreement.  Additionally, “hell or high water” provisions make it clear the parties’ intend to implacably bind themselves despite any contingencies.

When problems raising impossibility, force majeure, or impracticability issues arise, the key will be managing expectations.  If buyers suspect there are delays or other issues on the horizon, they should not hesitate to seek adequate assurances of performance from their suppliers. Likewise, if there are substantial additional costs or problems in maintaining the quality or quantity or the timing of supply, suppliers should notify their buyers as soon as practicable to adequately manage the relationship in the near term and maintain the relationship as the drought subsides and production gets back on track.

Think ahead when drafting important supply contracts.  Read your contracts closely when a problem arises and reach out to counterparties early to address potential problems before they arise or worsen.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/04/dry-times-how-to-deal-with-the-impact-of-californias-drought-on-critical-commercial-agreements/

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Spotlight on the Alabama State Bar

The Alabama State Bar was created in 1923 and has jurisdiction over the conduct of all attorneys and is charged with stimulating interest in improving the administration of justice. On Ringler Radio, host Larry Cohen and co-host, Keith Christie join guest, Attorney Anthony A. Joseph, President of the Alabama State Bar, to discuss the initiatives for 2014, membership, the Alabama State Bar Code of Professional Courtesy and the important services the Alabama State Bar offers the profession.

Source: http://traffic.libsyn.com/ringler/RR_061214_AlabamaBar.mp3

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Supreme Court Watch: Employment law cases

We will be watching three pending cases at the US Supreme Court as the Court's session opens today:

Kloeckner v. Solis
Oral argument on October 2.

The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) hears appeals by federal employees regarding certain adverse actions, such as dismissals. If the employee asserts that the challenged action was the result of unlawful discrimination, that claim is referred to as a "mixed case."

Question Presented: If the MSPB decides a mixed case without determining the merits of the discrimination claim, is the court with jurisdiction over that claim the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a district court?

Vance v. Ball State Univ
Oral argument on November 26.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) held that under Title VII, an employer is vicariously liable for workplace harassment by a supervisor of the victim. If the harasser was the victim’s co-employee, however, the employer is not liable absent proof of negligence.

Question Presented: Whether the Faragher and Ellerth “supervisor” liability rule (i) applies to harassment by those whom the employer vests with authority to direct and oversee their victim’s daily work, or (ii) is limited to those harassers who have the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” their victim.

Genesis HealthCare v. Symczyk
Oral argument December 3.

Symczk sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. This was a section 216(b) collective action. The defendants extended an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in full satisfaction of her alleged damages, fees, and costs - prior to her moving for conditional certification and prior to other potential plaintiffs opting in.

Question Presented: Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff's claims.

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Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/10/supreme_court_w_11.html

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Full D.C. Circuit Upholds Meat Labeling Rule

Meat producers must disclose where an animal is born, raised and slaughtered, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled Tuesday, holding that the congressionally mandated disclosure requirement does not violate commercial free speech protections.

Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sign_me_in.jsp?article=http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202665137770&rss=newswire

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Dry Times: How to Deal with the Impact of California’s Drought on Critical Commercial Agreements

On January 17, 2014, California Governor Jerry Brown declared a “State of Emergency” in California due to the severity of drought conditions across the State.  Since then, the California drought continues to be severe and unprecedented in recent years, and is taking a pervasive toll on California residents, businesses, farm land, foliage and wildlife.  Despite recent rainfall, local water districts and the State have called for voluntary, and in some locales, mandatory reduction in consumption of water.  After considering the severe human toll, anyone doing business with an entity located in California (or other western states experiencing similar drought conditions) that requires water for any business purpose, particularly farmers in Northern and Central California where there are fewer alternative sources of water, must be concerned about inventory and the impact of the drought on its supply chain.  Can my California contract counterparty fulfill its obligations to produce sufficient quantities of produce, dairy products, steel, flowers, honey, etc., to meet my contract needs?  Waiting for a delivery that never arrives, is delayed or arrives in lower quantity or, worse yet, quality, is not a viable option.  The key is to be prepared to find an alternative supplier so that production goals can be timely met.  Successful navigation of these issues requires careful contract drafting and contemplation in advance of new agreements, and critical analysis of existing contracts.  This article highlights the pertinent legal mechanisms at work and options for your business.

Section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) follows the longstanding common law derived principle of allowing the concerned recipient of supplies to demand adequate assurance of its supplier’s ability to perform.  The law adopted in most states provides that “when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.”  For purposes of Section 2-609, “reasonableness” will be “determined according to commercial standards” between merchants.  A failure by the recipient of a justified demand for adequate assurance to provide such assurances within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days, will be treated as a repudiation of the contract.

The key for those seeking assurances of performance is to describe with as much specificity as possible the reasonable grounds for “insecurity.”  In the case of the drought, one does not have to look far to find news articles describing the historic drought in significant detail and showing the hardest hit regions.  The form of the demand need not be a formal lawyers’ letter, but can be a friendly request to a good, long term vendor asking for assurances that product of the quality and quantity the recipient has come to expect will continue to be delivered within the time expected.  Setting a reasonable time frame for a response to the demand is also important and will depend upon the imminence of the need for or expected receipt of goods.

The form and clarity of the response will be key and is often heavily litigated.  Anything short of a prompt promise by a supplier to meet delivery and production obligations is a red flag and may be grounds for termination of an existing contract to purchase goods from that supplier; however, an unjustified early termination of contract rights is a breach, so a party considering terminating a supplier under an agreed contract should consider the risks of termination, particularly where the supplier is attempting to retain the right to supply.  Further, before demanding adequate assurance, the recipient may wish to investigate an alternative supply chain in case the response is insufficient and goods need to be reordered from another source.

Significantly, a supplier in dire financial straits that ends up in bankruptcy may still be the recipient of a demand for adequate assurance of its ability to perform.  Indeed, asking a debtor in bankruptcy for adequate assurance of its ability to perform its contractual obligations is a prudent business approach, though the ability of the non-debtor contract party to terminate is limited (proceeding by motion before the bankruptcy court to terminate is often the appropriate option if adequate assurance is not received or if a debtor confirms that it cannot perform).

Where a contract calls not just for supplies but for services, contract parties should look beyond the UCC to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Restatement”).  Section 251 of the Restatement provides in part that “where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a breach by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach,” then the “obligee may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he receives such assurance.”  In the Restatement, as in the UCC, failure to provide such assurance within a reasonable time is treated as a repudiation of the contract.

From the other perspective, a supplier who fears that it will be unable to meet the terms of its contract to supply goods in sufficient quantity, quality, or price, particularly where the costs of producing have markedly increased due to the impact of the drought, may attempt to invoke a claim of force majeure.  Many contracts have a force majeure provision that excuses performance (or non-performance) upon the occurrence of events such as (i) acts of God (e.g., severe droughts and storms) and (ii) man-made events (e.g., wars or certain acts of governments).  Employee strikes may also be viewed as a basis for a finding of force majeure in some contracts.

For the purposes of California law, the California Supreme Court gave the definitive definition of a force majeure in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228 (1946).  The Court explained that “‘Force majeure,’ or the Latin expression ‘vis major,’ is not necessarily limited to the equivalent of an act of God.  The test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party’s intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care.”  Id. at 238.

Additionally, acts of God can be involved in related “impossibility” scenarios.  For example, in Squillante v. California Lands, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 2d 89 (1935), the California Court of Appeal excused a grower from having to deliver a full quantity of grapes under an excuse of impossibility due to drought conditions.  There, the contract stipulated a certain quality and variety of grape.  The drought made it impossible for that grower to grow grapes of the sufficient quality and variety, and therefore the court held that the grower could not be compelled to perform impossibilities and that it could not be held liable in damages for its failure to comply with the contract because the failure resulted from no fault of its own.  (The court also stressed the importance of the “grower” not being a “dealer” of grapes, in that they suggest that a dealer may not have been so excused.)  While this case dates from 1935, it is apparently still good law.

The scenarios above do not address the situation where a supplier is not necessarily prevented from supplying, but the cost of supplying increases so significantly higher than anticipated, that performance under the contract becomes commercially “impracticable.”  While related to the concepts of force majeure and impossibility, impracticability is a distinct problem.  Section 2-615 of the UCC provides that, absent a supplier assuming a greater obligation, “delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.”

A successful defense of impracticability also requires that seller “notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery,” and, in the case of reduced or limited capacity to perform, that the seller then allocate production and deliveries among his customers in a “fair and reasonable” manner.

In the Official Comments to UCC Section 2-615, the American Law Institute explained that generally, “increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.  But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section” (emphasis added).

Whether a defense of impracticability rests on the increased cost resulting from shortages of water or other inputs affected by the drought, or from a governmental regulation or order limiting access to water, impracticability clearly represents an intractable problem absent clear contract drafting and advice.  Contract drafters have several tools at their disposal to more clearly delineate the parties’ risk allocation.  For example, properly constructed force majeure clauses should address the risk of supervening events expressly in the agreement.  Additionally, “hell or high water” provisions make it clear the parties’ intend to implacably bind themselves despite any contingencies.

When problems raising impossibility, force majeure, or impracticability issues arise, the key will be managing expectations.  If buyers suspect there are delays or other issues on the horizon, they should not hesitate to seek adequate assurances of performance from their suppliers. Likewise, if there are substantial additional costs or problems in maintaining the quality or quantity or the timing of supply, suppliers should notify their buyers as soon as practicable to adequately manage the relationship in the near term and maintain the relationship as the drought subsides and production gets back on track.

Think ahead when drafting important supply contracts.  Read your contracts closely when a problem arises and reach out to counterparties early to address potential problems before they arise or worsen.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/04/dry-times-how-to-deal-with-the-impact-of-californias-drought-on-critical-commercial-agreements/

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Software Snafu Delays Bar Exam Submissions

Taking the bar exam is nerve-racking enough. But in multiple states this week, many would-be lawyers who sat for the two-day test had to cope with a whole new level of stress after a software processing glitch temporarily prevented students from submitting their answers.

Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/30/software-snafu-delays-bar-exam-submissions/?mod=WSJBlog

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All Zimmerman or All Trayvon Martin

Many criminal defense lawyers studiously ignore cases that catch the public's attention. They just aren't that legally interesting, even if the facts or issues give rise to popular passion. And so it's been for the trial of George Zimmerman for murder 2º in the killing of Trayvon Martin.  Aside from John Steele's having raised the question of the ethics of overcharging, there hasn't been a whole lot to write about.

Now that the trial is coming to a close, however, an interesting question, both legal and tactical, has arisen: would it be best for the defense to take an all-or-nothing approach, murder 2º or acquittal, or a split-the-baby approach, charging the jury on the lesser-included crime of manslaughter. 

As Jacob Gershman writes at the Wall Street Journal law blog, the die has been cast.

George Zimmerman was charged with second-degree murder in the shooting death of Trayvon Martin. So why do jurors now have an option of convicting him of manslaughter?

The short answer: the judge said they could.

Yet the option, which was supported by prosecutors but raised the hackles of the defense, is not clearly spelled out in Florida law.

Notwithstanding what either party individually contends, it remains the judge's responsibility to decide whether to submit a lesser-included offense to the jury if one party requests it.  So if the prosecution felt sufficiently secure in its case that it would get a murder conviction, while the defense feared conviction and was looking to find an out, they would be fighting against a manslaughter instruction lest the jury, feeling any sympathy toward the defendant, compromise.  That's not happening here.

While it may be that Zimmerman's claim of self-defense, that he feared his life to be so endangered as to allow him to lawfully kill another person, isn't entirely persuasive, there is strong support for his claim that he was in fear, even if he overreacted.

Florida law works differently. There’s no slicing and dicing of self-defense. The penal code doesn’t recognize “imperfect self defense.” The law forces juries to either believe that someone had a right to act in self-defense or is a murderer.

There is a loophole, however, as illustrated by Mr. Zimmerman’s trial, which entered into closing arguments Thursday.

In Florida, a judge can choose to give juries a middle-of-the-road option, saying it can convict someone of voluntary  manslaughter if it isn’t convinced that the defendant acted out of “ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent.” Voluntary manslaughter is a catch-all offense that includes a killing caused by “culpable negligence.”


That the prosecution chose to shoot low and hope for a compromise rather than a murder conviction, while the defense went for all-or-nothing and fought the lesser charge, reflects their view of the relative strength of their case. Not surprisingly, the prosecution is showing some serious weakness in its faith that its murder 2 charge will bear out. 

As John Steele argued before trial, there is a strong current of thought that the prosecution followed a political path, appeasing angry voices demanding Justice for Trayvon without giving the facts of the case much thought. It appears that the trial evidence has borne this out to a large extent.

But most damning is the prosecution's second request of Judge Debra Nelson.

Prosecutor Richard Mantei argued that instructions for third-degree murder should be included on the premise that Zimmerman committed child abuse when he fatally shot 17-year-old Trayvon Martin because Martin was underage.

But defense attorney Don West called the proposed instruction "a trick," and he accused the prosecutor of springing it on the defense at the last minute.

"Just when I didn't think this case could get any more bizarre, the state is alleging child abuse?" West said. "This is outrageous. It's outrageous the state would seek to do this at this time."

So a reduced charge of manslaughter still isn't sufficient for the prosecution to reach its comfort zone, and it's digging even deeper for an even lesser charge of murder 3º.  Not only is that damning and humiliating, but as West says, it's "outrageous."  What's next, trespassing because Zimmerman walked on somebody else's lawn?

It appears that while the judge hasn't tossed the murder 2º count as being legally insufficient, which would seem to address the ethical question of the charge being within the very large ballpark of reasonable charges under the facts of the case, neither the judge nor the prosecution has much faith that the jury will convict. The prosecution is now grasping at straws, hoping to get a conviction for anything it can.

For the defense, given the evidence that's come in, this isn't a good thing or particularly fair thing. They tried a case to the charge, and are now faced with the possibility of a compromise verdict from a jury that might feel badly enough at the death of a young man (which is quite understandable, regardless of whether he contributed to it) to feel that Zimmerman ought to be convicted of something

While this isn't the way it's supposed to go in theory, it's a nightmare for the defense, having fought the charge only to face being skewered by a compromise.






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Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/12/all-zimmerman-or-all-trayvon-martin-2.aspx?ref=rss

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Rachel Vitti: School superintendent's wife making her own mark on educational and human rights issues (Florida Times-Union)

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Tuesday, July 29, 2014

Mark Woods: New Year's resolution: Be like Mr. Bob (Florida Times-Union)

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Second Circuit Offers More 'Clarity' in False Advertising Case

A district court's award of treble damages and legal fees against a dietary supplement maker that falsely advertised the chemical composition of its product was upheld Tuesday by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sign_me_in.jsp?article=http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202665146600&rss=newswire

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The Best of the Plaintiffs Bar

These 19 firms are at the cutting edge of plaintiffs' work -- and are giving defense players a run for their money.

Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202624154645?rss=rss_nlj

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Heidi Alexander Interviews Lawducate Founder Kelli Proia at Mass LOMAP Conference

Heidi Alexander, co-host of The Legal Toolkit, interviews Kelli Proia, founder of the legal business training organization Lawducate, during Mass LOMAP's 4th Annual Super Marketing Conference. She explains how a law firm is like any business, and recommends lawyers put effort into marketing and outsource necessary areas like creating a website. Lawducate, one of the co-sponsoring organizations at Mass LOMAP, teaches fundamental business marketing and sales techniques to lawyers.

Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/special-reports/2014/07/heidi-alexander-interviews-lawducate-founder-kelli-proia-mass-lomap-conference

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Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Securities Fraud Complaint Where Inference of Scienter Was Not Sufficiently Strong

In Yates v. Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC, No. 12-2496 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), against defendant Municipal Mortgage & Equity (“MuniMae”) and its individual officer and director defendants.  The Court held that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of defendants’ scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, et seq.  The Court declined to accept that the inference of scienter offered by plaintiffs — supported by statements from confidential witnesses, presence of red flags, allegations of insider trading and general business incentives — was at least as compelling as the opposing inference of mere negligence that could be drawn from the amended complaint.  Yates is one of the few reported decisions from the Fourth Circuit applying the PSRLA, and it solidly reaffirms the PSLRA’s requirement that a plaintiff plead more than just allegations based upon conjecture and happenstance to satisfy heightened pleading requirements.

During the putative class period (May 3, 2004 to January 29, 2008) MuniMae was involved in organizing investment partnerships to pool low-income housing tax credits (“LIHTCs”) and sell them to investors.  Prior to 2003, MuniMae treated its LIHTC investment partnerships as off balance sheet entities.  In 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board adopted Interpretation No. 46R (“FASB 46R”), requiring that a company that is the primary beneficiary of “Variable Interest Entities” consolidate the entities assets and liabilities onto its financial statements.  MuniMae began asserting compliance with FASB 46R in the first quarter of 2004.  However, at that time MuniMae internally concluded that FASB 46R did not require it to consolidate for financial statement purposes all of tis LIHTC investment partnerships.  MuniMae continued to assert compliance with FASB 46R through 2006.  In September 2006, MuniMae announced it would be restating certain financial statements and through a series of later disclosures finally announced that the restatement would deal with FASB 46R accounting errors.  As a result of the piecemeal disclosures, MuniMae’s share price dropped precipitously.  The following day, MuniMae disclosed the full extent of the restatement’s scope and MuniMae’s stock experienced an additional decline.  Eventually, in April 2008, MuniMae disclosed that it had spent over $54 million on the restatement.

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that defendants made false representations that MuniMae was complying with FASB 46R and concealed the expected cost of the restatement in violation of Section 10(b).  The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that the amended complaint did not sufficiently allege a claim under Section 10(b) because it did not meet the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard for scienter allegations.  Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.  First, the Fourth Circuit held that the confidential witness testimony supplied by plaintiffs did not support a “strong inference of wrongful intent.”  The testimony did suggest that defendants knew earlier than disclosed that MuniMae was not in compliance with 46R and that the required restatement would be a difficult and costly undertaking.  It also indicated that the issue was difficult and complex and had thrown MuniMae into “confusion and chaos” — which the Court held supported the opposing inference that the defendants were merely negligent.  In fact, the Court explained, defendants’ subsequent disclosures negated an inference of fraudulent intent because, although the disclosures were not “as timely or as fulsome” as plaintiffs would have liked, they gave rise to a compelling inference that the MuniMae defendants were attempting to keep the investing public informed.

Second, the Court held that while there were several “red flags” concerning MuniMae’s core operations — the need in and of itself for several restatements, frequent accounting meetings, the firing of outside auditors, and rapid CFO overturn — they did not in and of themselves give rise to a strong inference of scienter.  Not only was the FASB 46R accounting error not especially obvious, but the other warning signs easily lent themselves to benign interpretations as a result of MiniMae’s obvious attempts to get a handle on its creeping accounting problems.

Third, the Court of Appeals followed the decisions of several other Circuits in holding insufficient plaintiffs’ allegation that the individual defendants “must have acted intentionally or recklessly” merely because they were senior executives and the LIHTC investment partnerships represented a core business of MuniMae.

Fourth, in addressing plaintiffs’ allegations concerning insider trading, the Court held that while the overall value of MuniMae shares sold during the class period was higher than in previous years and thus consistent with an inference that the insiders who traded had a motive to commit fraud, the inference that the trades were innocent was stronger.  There were no allegations that the insiders timed their sales to take advantage of any particular disclosure.  Nor was the level of any insiders’ divestiture particularly alarming.  Moreover, the Court noted, the fact that several of the individual defendants traded under non-discretionary Rule 10b5-1 plans further weakened any inference of fraudulent purpose.

Finally, the Court held that plaintiffs other allegations of motive were similarly lacking as the alleged motivations amounted to nothing more than “financial motivations common to every company.”

Thus, in Yates, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the heightened standard of pleading a plaintiff must meet to satisfy the PSLRA.  Specifically, the Court emphasized that the allegations of scienter under Section 10(b) cannot be read in a vaccum.  They must be holistically analyzed in comparison with the disclosures actually made by defendants.  General business motivations, insider trading and the core nature of the problems alleged by plaintiffs cannot turn a company’s repeated attempts to inform investors of the ongoing and ever-evolving nature of a problem into intentional rather than merely negligent conduct.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/04/fourth-circuit-affirms-dismissal-of-securities-fraud-complaint-where-inference-of-scienter-was-not-sufficiently-strong/

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This Week on Legal Talk Network (7/14/14)

Hello. This is Laurence Colletti for This Week on Legal Talk Network. On Monday, Sharon Nelson and Jim Calloway from the Digital Edge talk to expert Tom Spahn about the ethics involved when a law firm breaks up or a lawyer wants to leave. Here's a preview- On Wednesday, The Legal Toolkit's Jared Correa continues our Special Report series from the MASS LOMAP 4th Annual Super-Marketing Conference and interviews Joyce Brafford from NCBA on how to manage social media to improve client relationships. Thursday, Heidi Alexander returns to the conference to speak to Kelli Proia from Lawducate about the how to run and market your law firm like a regular business. And on Friday, we finish the week with The Kennedy-Mighell Report - our hosts Dennis Kennedy and Tom Mighell discussing the new 3rd edition of Tom's book "iPad in One Hour for Lawyers" - what's happening with the iPad now and what to expect in the future. So tune in. It's all right here . . . This Week on Legal Talk Network.

Source: http://traffic.libsyn.com/sr/This_Week_on_LTN_7-14_Audio_Only.mp3

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Seven arrested in $1.6 million StubHub fraud case

[JURIST] New York District Attorney Cyrus Vance [official profile] announced [press release] Wednesday that police have arrested seven individuals on charges connecting them to an international group that defrauded the online ticketing service StubHub [official website] of approximately $1.6 million. Six of the seven arrests were made Tuesday, including three in London, two in New York and one in Toronto. The seventh individual was arrested earlier this month in Spain. The remaining cybercriminals include an American that is expected to...

Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/07/seven-arrested-in-16-million-stubhub-fraud-case.php

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